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INTRODUCTION 
One of the keys to the promotion of economic growth that 
enables countries to progress from recession to recovery is 
increasing the quantity and quality of technological inventions 
developed. 1  Concerns about the steady erosion of the United 
States’ (U.S.) position as the world leader in science and 
technology—areas which are considered to be the critical building 
blocks to the U.S. economy—led President Barack Obama to make 
improving innovation a top priority during his presidency, which 
included initiating a study on ways to improve innovation.2  This 
move by the U.S. President came at a time when many other 
nations had started to lay strong foundations in these same areas.3  
The study was based on the idea that, in order to succeed in 
maintaining U.S. strength, we must have the will to implement and 
sustain the policies that will prepare the U.S. to continue being an 
economic leader moving forward.4
                                                                                                             
1 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF 
THE U.S. 2–1 (2012), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter 
WHITE HOUSE STUDY]. 
  The main conclusions of the 
2 WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1.  On January 4, 2011, President Barack Obama 
signed the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111–385, 124 
Stat. 3982 (2011) (hereinafter “Competes Act”).  Section 604 of the Competes Act 
instructs the Secretary of Commerce to complete a study that addresses the economic 
competitiveness and innovative capacity of the United States.  The study was carried out 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce, signed by the Secretary of Commerce, John E. 
Brtyson, and completed in January 2012. See also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. 
(WIPO), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, WIPO ECONOMICS AND 
STATISTICS SERIES 3, 21 fig.3 (2011) [hereinafter WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS] (illustrating that the US contribution to the global change in total volume of 
filings narrowed from 23.9% in 1983-1980 to 19.4% in 1995-2008). 
3 Soumitra Dutta and Bruno Lanvin, Eds., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2013 – 
THE LOCAL DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION, at v (Cornell, INSEAD and WIPO, 2013) 
available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/economics/gii/
gii_2013.pdf. 
4 Id. (“Innovation is the key driver of competitiveness, wage and job growth, and long 
term economic growth.”). 
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White House Study on fostering innovation were based on three 
pillars: (a) enlarging federal support of research in innovative 
fields; (b) improving the education system by improving 
preparatory programs in science and technology related fields; and 
(c) improving infrastructure, such as broadband internet access.5
This Article suggests a completely different path towards 
achieving the same final goal, a path that was entirely neglected in 
the White House study—that is, the significant and substantial role 
of employee-inventors in elevating the level of U.S. innovation 
within the workplace.
 
6  Considering the fact that around eighty to 
ninety percent of all inventions in the U.S. are the work of 
employed inventors,7
The intersection between the roles and rights of employers and 
those of employee-inventors is the focus of this Article, since they 
are relevant to the achievement of growth and development.  
Employed inventors play a major role in the promotion and 
advancement of technological innovation, and therefore, 
policymakers should give ample weight to their role.  The research 
embodied in this Article suggests a desirable new policy for the 
allocation of rights in and benefits from inventions developed by 
employees.
  one might be surprised that the employee-
inventors were not part of the discussions and, indeed, were not 
mentioned at all.  Improving the productivity of these employed 
inventors, in order to generate more innovative ideas and pursue 
worthy ones to the point of economic viability, has to become a 
critical factor in the modern commercial era, and even more so 
now in a time of recession. 
8
I further suggest that the recent modifications of Patent laws in 
the U.S. and abroad, instead of considering the integral role of 
 
                                                                                                             
5 WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at v–viii. 
6 See discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
7 See Henrik D. Parker, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 
603, 603 (1984) (stating that “[b]ecause technological innovation is one of the United 
States’ most important economic resources, this country cannot afford to allow other 
countries to continue carving out increasingly larger shares of the market for 
technology”); William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer’s Rights to His 
Employee’s Invention, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 863 (1983) (“Eighty-four percent of 
American patents are awarded to employed inventors . . . .”). 
8 See discussion infra Part VI. 
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employed inventors, evidence continued strengthening of the pro-
corporate approach. 9   For example, in the U.S., the America 
Invents Act amended U.S. Patent law to facilitate employer 
organizations to submit patent applications without an oath or 
declaration from the employee-inventor.10  If the employer entity 
has a financial interest in the invention, it can proceed without 
seeking the inventor’s approval.11  Before this amendment, patent 
applications included the employee-inventor’s oath or declaration, 
and the patent was filed under the employee-inventor’s name even 
when the employer had an economic interest in the invention.12
In Germany, the German Service Invention Act was modified 
to now state that if the employer does not explicitly waive his or 
her claim regarding the service invention within four months of 
receiving an employee’s report, the invention and all the rights 
associated with it belong to the employer.
 
13  Previously, German 
Patent law was based on the principle that the employee was the 
owner of the invention and an employer was required to explicitly 
claim the rights in the invention, in compliance with strict rules 
that included compensation for the employee-inventor.14  Similar 
changes have also been suggested  in Israeli Patent law.15
                                                                                                             
9 See also Patents Law, 5727-1967, IL001 (1967) (Isr.), Draft Amendment (number 
10), 2010, §§ 18–19.  The Act amends Sections 132-134 of the Patent Act, and suggests a 
new scheme for allocating to the employer the rights in the employees’ inventions in 
cases in which the employee-inventor did not report the existence of any invention (not 
limited to service inventions) and also imposes restrictions on employee-inventor 
entitlement to consideration for service inventions when the employer has any other 
contractual arrangement with the employee.  These amendments also favor the 
employer’s rights over the ones of the employee. 
 
10 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4, 125 Stat. 284, 293–97 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
11 Id. 
12 See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and its 
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 95 (2012). 
13 Gesetz uber Arbeitnehmererfindungen [The German Service Invention Act], 1957 
(modified in 2009), BGBI. I S. at 2521 (Ger.) 
14 See Morag Peberdy & Alain Strowel, Employee’s Right to Compensation for 
Inventions – A European Perspective, PLC CROSS-BORDER LIFE SCIENCES HANDBOOK, 67 
(2009). 
15 Patents Law, 5727-1967, IL001 (1967) (Isr.), Draft Amendment (number 10), 2010, 
§§ 18–19 (amending §§ 132-134 of the Patent Act, and suggesting a new scheme for 
allocating to the employer the rights in the employees’ inventions in cases in which the 
employee-inventor did not report the existence of any invention and also imposing 
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These recent policy choices are part of a phenomenon that has 
been on the rise and already noted by scholars towards the end of 
the last century.16  This Article argues against both the growing 
general popularity of the pro-corporate approach, as well as its 
underlying goals and justifications.17  The Article claims that these 
goals and justifications are neither constitutionally nor 
theoretically sound.18
The majority of scholars who justify increasing corporate 
power and broadening protection to employers in the allocation of 
intellectual property (IP) rights within the workplace anchor their 
conclusions in law and economics.
 
19
                                                                                                             
restrictions on employee-inventor entitlement to consideration for service inventions 
when the employer has any other contractual arrangement with the employee). 
  These utilitarian 
justifications were preferred over others and have now become the 
16 See Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2215–33 (2000) (describing the “corporatization” of 
patent law; whereas in 1885, only 12% of patents were issued to corporations, and by 
1998, only 12.5% of patents were issued to independent inventors.  The rules governing 
ownership of employee inventions changed in ways that favored corporations and courts 
demonstrated an eagerness to enforce employment contracts signing ownership over to 
the corporation.  The shift toward preference of corporations can be seen in emergence of 
a default rule in favor of employer and in criticism of the tendency to favor the employed 
inventors). 
17 See discussion infra Parts I, II. 
18 See discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
19 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 1–5 
(Harvard Coll. Press 2004) (asserting that the measure of social welfare as well as 
morality and fairness will usually not accord importance to the economic analysis of 
intellectual property and to the distribution of utilities); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 37–45, 44 (6th ed., 2003) (“[T]he economic benefits of investing in 
intellectual property are not exhausted in the initial creation . . . .”); Dan L. Burk, 
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4, 8 (2004) (conceiving of 
intellectual property rights as mechanisms for coordinating activities between firms as 
well as for coordinating ordinate re-resource allocation within a firm); Robert P. Merges, 
The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (1999) 
(defending prevailing default rules, as well as the strong presumption that employee 
invention contracts should be enforced); see also Barak Y. Orbach, The Law and 
Economics of Creativity at the Workplace, in THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION 
PAPER SERIES 1, 118 (Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 356, 2002), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/356.pdf; Michael D. 
Birnhack, Who Owns Bratz? The Integration of Copyright and Employment Law, 20 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 95, 125, 140, 154–57 (2009) (criticizing the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court in the Bratz v. Barbie case by raising claims based on 
a law and economics perspective). 
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dominant school of thought in contemporary intellectual property 
theory. 20  The predominance of the utilitarian calculus likewise 
influences the scope and content of today’s intellectual property 
laws. In reexamining the subject, I argue that these justifications 
may in fact lead to a different conclusion.21
Economic/utilitarian theories of IP law are widely enlisted as 
the justification for the exclusive allocation of property rights in 
employee IP production to employers, either by courts or by 
employee contracts transferring all intellectual property rights to 
the employer.
  The allocation of 
rights in inventions and works developed by employees may 
actually give the employer a windfall when weighed against what 
is necessary to achieve optimal production. 
22  Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether the economic 
approach necessarily leads to desirable results.  It may indeed be 
that the economic approach actually compels a less than total 
transfer of rights to the employer.  A deeper examination of the 
economic analysis discloses the tension between arguments 
favoring a categorical preference for the employer as the exclusive 
recipient of rights in intellectual property products and arguments 
that favor the buttressing of employees’ rights. 23
                                                                                                             
20 See Peter Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 129–30 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
  This Article 
21 See discussion infra Part I. 
22 See Merges, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
23 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 7, at 603–04 (explaining that the United States is in 
danger of losing its position as the technological leader of the world as American 
innovation has decreased resulting in less patent productivity per dollar of investment 
than in many foreign countries and arguing that the current law does not incentivize 
employed inventors and this poses a threat to one of the United States’ most important 
economic resources); Jay Dratler, Jr., Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose of 
the Patent System, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 129, 130–34 (1979) (arguing that the current 
patent laws fail to provide effective incentives to inventors, most of whom work for large 
corporate or government employers, because the laws allow employers to require 
employee-inventors to assign all potential inventions to their employers); Hovell, supra 
note 7, at 863 (“The law must find a realistic but fair method of dividing an invention’s 
value between the inventor and the developer. The patent law, therefore, needs a broad, 
clear rule which will allow a fair division in most circumstances.”); Pat K. Chew, Faculty 
Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 259 (1992) 
(considering policy arguments against university ownership of faculty-generated 
inventions); Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World Unite! A Call for Collective Action by 
Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 684 (1997) (asserting that even 
brilliant and diligent labor by a properly-equipped and well supported inventor offers no 
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surveys both sets of claims, focusing on the question of whether 
the complete allocation of rights to employers ignores factors that 
favor a different mode of allocation and, as a result, causes 
efficiency failures in the specific areas that it purports to serve. 
This Article not only argues the case for a more balanced 
approach to the employer/employee-inventor within the workplace, 
but it also suggests a new model of rights allocation, one which 
would arguably enlarge the “whole pie” in a manner that would 
benefit employers, employees, and the public at large.24 Moreover, 
this subject, unlike many others concerning intellectual property, is 
not regulated by international protocol.  I point out that the 
inefficiency deriving from the absence of international regulation 
of employee-inventor rights stresses the need to establish an 
international tool, under the auspices of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), to address and regulate allocation 
of rights within the workplace.25
In introducing the subject and laying the groundwork for its 
discussion, I will briefly review the economic/utilitarian 
justifications for intellectual property law.  Subsequently, I will 
then primarily focus on the example of patents in developing an 
enhanced model for the allocation of employee-developed IP 
rights. Whereas most of the literature justifies the existing system, 
or else objects to it by presenting alternative theories, the principal 
innovation of this Article lies in its justification—stemming from a 
new law and economics perspective—of a more balanced model of 
allocating rights, which attaches significantly greater importance to 
employees’ rights. 
 
Part I of this Article provides a brief description of the current 
dominant U.S. legal approach regarding the rights and benefits of 
inventions developed by employees, mainly supporting 
transferring all IP rights in IP products from employed inventors to 
the employer/corporation.  This Article argues that it is apparent 
from recent court decisions that courts have played a major role in 
the validation of this pro-corporate policy through enforcement of 
                                                                                                             
assurance of a profitable or even useful outcome, regardless of the amount of money or 
time invested). 
24 See infra Part VI. 
25 Id. 
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pre-invention assignments of all intellectual property rights from 
employees to employers by contract.  Part I further describes the 
drawbacks of the current IP “pro-corporate” regime, such as the 
insufficient level of innovation when compared to IP regimes in 
other countries, as well as the problem of employers who adopt 
patent troll patterns by submerging inventions developed by 
employees without developing them for the benefit of the whole 
society.  Part II discusses, from innovative perspectives, the 
ramifications of the uncertainty surrounding transactions when 
transferring IP rights to inventions from the employed inventor to 
his or her employer.  This section describes the problem of “pre-
invention” transfer of rights, when the employees, usually 
unknowingly, waive the rights in products (or ideas) they have not 
yet developed (or thought about) at an early stage before they even 
commence work.  This Article criticizes the traditional explanation 
of risk allocation in the workplace, considering the employees as 
risk averse and the employer as risk neutral, because it ignores the 
specific features of the modern employed inventor.  Inter alia, the 
traditional analysis considers neither the risks of employed 
inventors nor the current era of “start-ups,” where employees 
become risk-seeking and eager to develop their own ideas while 
investors are willing to invest in the early “seed” phase inventions 
that employers might ignore.  This Article also analyzes a new 
study about the implications of risks under uncertainty on 
allocation of rights and describes the problematic outcomes to 
employed inventors and, as a result, on the innovation level.  Part 
III introduces the implications of the Principal-Agent theory on the 
allocation of IP rights between employer and employed inventor.  
The conclusion is that, in order to avoid the representative 
problem, employed inventors should benefit from the outcome of 
their works.  Part IV discusses the importance of incentives for 
employed inventors during the many stages of the development 
process of IP products within the workplace.  This discussion 
strongly supports providing greater incentive for employed 
inventors in order to elevate the level of innovation.  Having 
described the proposed solution to give employees a better share in 
order to enlarge the “whole pie,” one might reasonably expect the 
“free” market to reach this optimum result by adopting the most 
efficient strategy of allocation of rights and benefits between 
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employer and employed inventors.  This Article argues in Part V 
that the market fails to reach efficiency on this point.  Furthermore, 
this Article explains why the “free” market did not adopt efficient 
rules to promote and improve innovation level in the U.S.  
Cognitive biases, differences in bargaining power and the 
ineffectiveness of labor unions in the IP regime, have led to a non-
optimal level of output of innovative products in the workplace.  
Finally, Part VI suggests a new alternative model, based on the 
theoretical discussion, which is oriented to promote innovation in 
the U.S. 
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE WORKPLACE: 
EXISTING JUSTIFICATIONS 
A. The Current Intellectual Property Regime 
Over the years, American law has adopted a policy of giving 
the employers (almost) all of the intellectual property rights in 
products developed by employees in the work place.26  This policy 
has developed rapidly over the past few decades when, despite 
having roots favoring inventors, we have now moved toward 
designing new legal policies that have recently reached its most 
fevered pitch. 27   Under this new “ultra” pro-corporate regime, 
almost all rights in employees’ inventions are assigned to 
employers via either express or implied contracts, hence 
transferring IP rights from the employee-inventors to the 
employers.28  Courts have routinely upheld such contracts.  My 
examination of the most recent court decisions on this topic 
indicates that almost all of the decisions favor the employer 
“receiving” rights from the employees’ patent assignment 
agreement, either expressed in the view of at least one of the 
judges, or decided at some point in the case’s history.29
                                                                                                             
26 See Parker, supra note 
  Almost 
7, at 606–08 (explaining the common law of patents and how 
“[i]n response to ambiguities involved in applying common law doctrines, employers 
began using written contracts to allocate invention rights”). 
27 See Merges, supra note 16. 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (asserting 
that employee assignment agreement was valid and enforceable with only continued 
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universally, assignment agreements in which employees 
transferred rights to their inventions to the employer are 
recognized as valid, including in cases where the employees were 
not “Employed-To-Invent” (“ETI”) and even when the assignment 
of rights from employees to the employer was implicit. 30  This 
tendency has been justified within a contractual framework.31
This Article argues for a rethinking of the current policy 
toward a more balanced approach that instead considers the 
important role of employed inventors, but from a new perspective 
of uncertainty, which will be explained infra in Part II, that has not 
yet been deeply discussed in the literature.  This perspective may 
shed new light upon existing policy and illuminate possible 
alternatives to achieve more robust results. 
 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution endows 
“inventors” with rights to their “discoveries” (Patent Clause).32
                                                                                                             
employment as consideration); DDB Tech., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 
F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the employment agreement contained express 
assignment of rights in future inventions, and therefore an assignment of patent under the 
agreement would have been automatic); Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 
F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling that inventors were contractually obligated to assign 
patents and applications to university and that university was entitled to ownership of 
patents); SIRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the language of the employee assignment of rights to the employer  
provided for automatic assignment—no need for further steps); Harsco Corp. v. 
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3d Cir.1985) (affirming that the assignment agreement included 
inventions conceived by employee prior to his or her signing of agreement; employer’s 
agreement to continue to employ employee for a reasonable period of time provided 
sufficient consideration for patent assignment); Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 
83 F.3d 403 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that even an implied-in-fact contract to assign 
patent rights to employer existed within employer-employee relationship, in the absence 
of explicit agreement); Hedvat, supra note 4, at 823 (“[D]ecisions today focus more on 
the collective nature of research and development.”). 
  It 
is of note that the clause does not mention employer rights to an 
inventor’s work product.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
specifically ruled in United States v. Dubilier that this default rule 
30 See, e.g., Preston, 584 F.3d 1276 (holding that employee, a relief pumper in a 
resource extraction operation, who was not employed to invent must transfer rights to 
employer); Teets, 83 F.3d 403 (ruling that there was an implied-in-fact contract to assign 
inventive rights to employer). 
31 See Teets, 83 F.3d at 408. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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can be contracted around.33 The Court stated that in the event of a 
contractual transfer of rights, the contract is enforceable and the 
rights will be transferred to the employer even if the contract was 
drawn up before the employee began work.34  Furthermore, in the 
event that there was no explicit contractual transfer of rights, if the 
worker falls under the ETI category, the rights will pass 
automatically from the employee to the employer.35  Other courts 
have held that, in cases where the employee made use of the 
employer’s resources, the employer will receive a non-exclusive 
right of use for no consideration, also known as a “shop right.”36
Thus, the courts have played a major role in the validation and 
enforcement of assignments of intellectual property rights from 
employees to employers.  This allocation of rights ostensibly stems 
from the attempted “balancing” of rights between the employer 
and the employee that would, presumably, spur the most invention 
(so as to comply with the dictates of the Patent Clause).
 
37
This policy of favoring employers has developed so widely that 
employers now can almost assume ownership of the very thoughts 
of employees.  An example of this is an arrangement for 
encouraging workers’ proposals, known as an “employee 
  
However, the actual result of the despotic nature of this pro-
employer approach is that a significant number of employment 
contracts transfer all intellectual property rights to employers and 
thereby divest the employees of any rights to inventions usually in 
the very early stages of their employment.  This minimizing of 
employee’s rights and consequently, their motivation level, 
obviously cannot maximize economic growth. 
                                                                                                             
33 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Johnson, 409 F.Supp. 190, 199 (N.D. III. 1976) (“Shop rights 
can be best described as an irrevocable, free, and nonexclusive license to the employer to 
use the employee’s invention.”); see also Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 
1976); Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng’g, Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1961). 
37 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (holding “[i]nnovation, 
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent 
requisites in a patent system” governed by a command such as the one found in the 
Constitution of the United States). 
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suggestion plan.”37F 38   These arrangements govern situations in 
which employees raise ideas on a voluntary basis and, in the event 
that the idea is approved, such a plan dictates that it becomes the 
exclusive property of the employer. 38F39  In exchange, the employee 
can then be entitled to future consideration in the form of payment, 
but such payment is sometimes discretionary. 39F40  Further, employee 
suggestion plans are, on occasion, found to be mere gratuities that 
do not give rise to a binding obligation on the employer to even 
award the employee for his/her idea. 40F41 
A further example of employee ideas vesting in the employer is 
found in the Brown v. Alcatel case.41F42  In Brown, the court ruled 
that a company owned the rights to an idea that existed entirely in 
the thoughts of a former employee. 42F43  The court’s ruling takes the 
idea of an employer’s ownership of employee inventions to its 
most absurd conclusion. 
However, the U.S. regime is certainly not the only alternative.  
Other leading industrialized countries have adopted vastly different 
                                                                                                             
38 See Fish v. Ford Motor Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 113, 115 (1987) (“The purpose of 
having an employee suggestion plan is to reward ideas and promote employee 
participation in the manufacturing process.  These programs are to give the employees 
incentives to work harder and generate possible improvements.  The rewards given may 
be minimal compared to the benefits to the company, but an employee that is rewarded 
may work more eagerly knowing quality work will be appreciated.”); see also Donna 
Domagala, Employee Suggestion Plans: Building a Better Mousetrap or the 
Misappropriation of Ideas?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 39l, 392–93 (1997) (“Despite the 
notion that no one ‘owns’ ideas, courts have recognized that people often expend 
considerable resources in creating ideas with an expectation to recover value from their 
use.”). 
39 See Domagala, supra note 38, at 419–20. 
40 See Hodgkins v. New England Tel. Co., 82 F.3d 1226, 1228 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a clause in an employee suggestion plan which reserved full discretion to the 
employer when awarding employees was not an illusory promise but that the employer 
could not refuse to award an employee arbitrarily). 
41 See Domagala, supra note 38, at 396–97 (noting that suggestion box systems do 
elicit extra ideas from employees, but that compensation for ideas falls below the level 
that might be expected.). But see Grepke v. Gen. Elec. Co., 280 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1960) 
(holding employee was damaged by employer’s appropriation of his idea, where 
employee suggested a novel method for inserting balancing weights in armatures of 
electric motors, which the employer rejected and later used). 
42 Brown v. Alcatel USA, Inc., No. 05-02-01678-CV, 2004 WL 1434521 (Tex. App., 
5th Dist. June 28, 2004). 
43 Id. at *3. 
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policies and as we have recently seen, are thriving economically.  
In Japan, for example, an amendment to their patent laws provides 
that the employee-inventor is entitled to reasonable compensation 
for his or her invention.43F44  In the Scandinavian states, Germany, 
and France, the statutory regime regulating employees’ rights over 
their inventions also grants rights of compensation to the 
employee-inventor. 44F 45 Furthermore, in some cases such 
compensation is subject to employee mandatory entitlement to 
reasonable consideration above and beyond his or her salary. 45F46 
B. Drawbacks of the Current Intellectual Property  Regime 
1. The Level of Innovation 
One of the principal downsides of the current U.S. regime is 
that such a policy fails to capitalize on an employee’s potential 
productivity. The level of potential innovation can be examined by 
exploring the number of patent applications from a particular 
country at any given year.46F47  It is well known that in the United 
States, the total number of patent applications per year is 
significantly high.47F48  However, these figures might be misleading.  
                                                                                                             
44 Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 35; see also JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, THE CASE 
STUDIES OF THE PROCEDURES UNDER THE NEW EMPLOYEE INVENTION SYSTEM, 9–11 
(2004), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/iken_e/pdf/200408_newep/001.pdf. 
45 See Sanna Wolk, Remuneration of Employee Inventors – Is There a Common 
European Ground?, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. AND COMPETITION L. 272–98 (2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1855004 (comparing 
national laws regarding employees’ inventions and inventors’ compensation in Germany, 
France, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14 
(same). 
46 See Wolk, supra note 45, at 279–92. 
47 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO PATENT REPORT: 
STATISTICS ON WORLDWIDE PATENT ACTIVITIES (2007) [hereinafter WIPO PATENT 
REPORT] (noting that patent applications “are a reliable indicator of underlying inventive 
activity); see also WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at 2–6 (commenting that on 
regional innovation clusters, evidence shows that areas with strong clusters perform 
better economically than areas without these clusters; they have higher job growth, higher 
wage growth, more businesses, and a higher rate of patenting.  The first is the proxy 
method, where rather than measuring innovation directly, patents or spending on R&D 
are tracked as a proxy for the level or rate of change of innovation). 
48 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 
14, 17 (2012) (showing the United States as the country with the most patent applications 
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In order to accurately analyze ways of improving the level of 
innovation, one must consider not only the total number of patent 
applications, but also other features, such as the number of patent 
applications per capita, the number of non-resident patent filings as 
a percentage of total filings, the ratio of patent applications versus 
accepted patents, and the level of investment in research and 
development.  Estimation of U.S. innovation according to these 
criteria leads to problematic results.49
One of the central problems is that the current IP regime risks 
failing to effectively incentivize employee invention.  In countries 
where the employee’s entitlement to more rights is guaranteed up 
front and unequivocally, there is a high level of inventiveness.
 
50  
Germany and the Scandinavian states, for example, grant their 
employees, apart from their salary, priority right on their own 
inventions; that is, employee-inventors, who transfer the rights to 
their invention, are awarded with special monetary consideration.51
The Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz, had 
already expressed his concern regarding the possible slowdown in 
economic development of the U.S. at the end of the twentieth 
  
Even though intellectual property products, developed in the 
workplace by employees, are given to the employer, the process of 
transferring rights in employee inventions includes paying 
consideration to the employee-inventor for his or her role in the 
creative process. 
                                                                                                             
representing 26.6% of worldwide totals); see also WIPO PATENT REPORT, supra note 47, 
at 12. 
49 See WIPO PATENT REPORT, supra note 47, at 16 (showing that the U.S. percentage 
of resident patent fillings was only 53%, whereas 47% were non-resident patent fillings); 
see also Parker, supra note 7, at 603 (noting that in 1980, only 38.9% were issued to non-
US citizens or corporations and that ten years before that, only 25% of all patents granted 
in the United States were issued to foreign entities); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS, supra note 2. 
50 THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2012: STRONGER INNOVATION LINKAGES FOR 
GLOBAL GROWTH, xviii  (Soumitra Dutta, Ed., INSEAD & WIPO, 2012), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/economics/gii/gii_2012.pdf  
[hereinafter GII 2012].  Countries such as Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands and Denmark that guarantee rights or special compensation to employed 
inventors achieved a higher position than the US, which was ranked as the 10th place. 
51 See Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14. 
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century. 51F52 The recent recession proved just how prescient his claim 
was.  The U.S. government invests a tremendous amount in 
research and development. 52F53  Despite this, according to Stiglitz, the 
U.S. occupies a low place on the ladder of innovation as compared 
to some European countries.53F54  Economic development stems from 
three sources: increased capital, improved human capital 
(measured by the quality of employees), and technological 
changes. These factors are all closely related.  During a time of 
economic slowdown, the first factor is neutralized temporarily. As 
such, the second factor becomes all the more important in 
influencing economic development.  Human capital is, therefore, 
what can be expected to respond positively to a change in the 
allocation of intellectual property in places of work, as this is 
where most inventions in the U.S. are developed.54F55 
Other scholars have expressed similar concerns regarding the 
relatively low rate of patents per capita registered by resident 
workers. 55F 56 This phenomenon, which even during times of 
prosperity, has not succeeded in generating reforms in the U.S., 
                                                                                                             
52 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 342−44, 347−48 (3d ed. 
2000). 
53 See WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at 3–12 (indicating that, of the non-defense 
federal budget, 49% went to the National Institute of Health (NIH) for fiscal years 2009-
2011 and that there was a constant increase in scientific R&D federal funding since 
1986); see also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/2011_erp_full.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2012) (“In 2009, the Obama Administration put in place the largest funding 
increase for basic science in U.S. history, with an $18.3 billion contribution from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act . . . recent studies find that research tax credits 
translate dollar-for-dollar into increases in current research spending, especially over the 
longer run as businesses develop their research enterprises.”). 
54 See STIGLITZ, supra note 52 (noting that the research and development as might be 
expressed, for example, in the number of requests for patents per capita.  Defense 
purposes constitute 57% of the entire research and development budget.  Thus, the 
investment rate in the U.S. for purposes other than defense is inadequate). 
55 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
56 See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 23, at 129−30 (“During the past decade, commentators 
on the state of American technology have noted a decline in the rate of innovation in 
America.  Imports of technology-intensive manufactured products have been growing 
faster than exports of these products, contributing to a serious balance of payments 
deficit. Foreign inventors have increased their share of newly issued American patents at 
the expense of domestic inventors.  In addition, the national rate of production of 
patented inventions has decreased, whether measured per dollar of research funding or 
per research worker.”). 
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becomes far more acute during a time of crisis.  Some time ago it 
had already been forecasted: 
The United States has a declining patent balance 
and is less patent productive per dollar than are 
many foreign countries. Given that technological 
innovation is one of the United States’ most 
important economic resources, this country cannot 
allow other countries to continue carving out 
increasingly larger shares of the market for 
technology. 57
The promotion of new technologies is an important political 
goal for the governments of many states; therefore, they should 
adopt a policy that encourages productivity and innovation. 
  
The current policy relies on a one-sided justification without 
acknowledging that utilitarian arguments are far from monolithic 
and without recognizing a number of other possibilities.  
Insufficient attention has been given to some important factors in 
the law and economics discourse. For example, the implications of 
the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of transferring rights 
from the employed inventor to the employer before any invention 
has been developed 58  or to the high tech era, which requires 
investment at early stages, such as for start-ups, 59 which will be 
discussed in the following sections. 60
                                                                                                             
57 Parker, supra note 
  The need to increase 
7, at 603; see also WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at 1−7 and 
1−8 (commenting on recent reports which “indicated that the United States had made 
little or no progress in its competitiveness since 1999 and now ranks fourth in innovation-
based competitiveness”). 
58 See discussion infra Part II; see also United States v. Dubilier, 298 U.S. 178, 188 
(1933) (noting that the reason courts are reluctant “to imply or infer an agreement by the 
employee to assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of the act of 
invention . . . .”). 
59 See MINN. DEP’T OF EMP’T AND ECON. DEV., A GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY FINANCE 
(2005), available at http://cdm16105.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16105coll5/
id/2425 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) for an example in the biotechnology field where 
investments are made at the early commercialization stage of biotechnology entities.  
This guide defines early commercialization stage according to my own perception of 
start-ups; see also Shannon H. Hedvat, A New Age of Pro-Employer Rights: Are 
Automatic Assignments the Standard?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 817, 823 (2011) (noting that 
many significant inventions are being developed at and supported by start-ups).  
60 See discussion infra Part II. 
156 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:140 
 
creative activity within the workplace is not the only conclusion 
that must be drawn in order to criticize and change the current 
policy.  The tendency of employers to amass patents, instead of 
developing them, is another anti-innovation result of the privileges 
granted to them under the current regime. 
2. Employers as “Patent Trolls” 
The allocation of rights to employers under the current regime 
may give the employer more rights than are actually required and 
in a manner that impairs the efficient use of the product for the 
public interest.  The employer’s status as the “decider” in the 
product development process enables it to determine: (i) who is 
entitled to work with certain ideas to be developed into final 
products, (ii) the conditions of that work, and (iii) for our purposes, 
the rights in relation to the product, including those that will be 
received by subordinates—if any at all.  Further, the employer 
controls the ultimate fate of the employee’s invention.61  That is, 
an employer can decide whether or not to develop, market, or use 
the product at all and/or to use it to sue (or, generally, fight 
against) others.  Such activity by entities, commonly referred to as 
“patent trolls,” have generated mass discussion.62  There are many 
reasons why firms submerge patents and avoid developing them 
into commercial products, oftentimes against the public interest.  
Firms store patents in their “drawers” in order to prevent 
competitors from developing similar ones, to wipe out smaller 
entities, or to focus on an already-developed, marketed product and 
avoid the expense of developing a new one.63
                                                                                                             
61 See Merges, supra note 
 
16, at 2219–22 (noting that patents are used by corporate 
entities as part of the corporate patent strategy for “blocking patents” to counter an 
industrial rival instead for the progress of science and useful arts). 
62 See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
8, 2012, at A1 (“[T]he marketplace for new ideas has been corrupted by software patents 
used as destructive weapons . . . . In the smart phone industry alone, as much as $20 
billion was spent on patent litigation and patent purchases in the last two years - an 
amount equal to eight Mars rover missions.”). 
63 See Julie S. Turner, Comment: The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a 
Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 186−87, 194−96 (1998) 
(criticizing the decisions of firms, supported by court decisions, to avoid developing 
efficient patents while focusing on less developed products that they already produced, as 
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Although literature has extensively discussed the subject of 
patent trolls, its connection to the employer-employee relationship 
has not been deeply mentioned. Giving the employer, as opposed 
to the employee-inventor, full control over the product is a key 
factor that enables the employer to submerge patents while 
simultaneously prohibiting its development by others.  When the 
employer fails to exploit a product for its own purposes of 
maintaining market power or ensuring the continued success of an 
already-existing product—goals which may be opposed to those of 
its employees—the public necessarily loses access to valuable 
intellectual property goods.  Thus, the current pro-employer regime 
creates distorted incentives for firms with numerous products 
already on the market to hold back newer, more innovative ones. 
II. TRANSFER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER 
TRANSACTIONAL UNCERTAINTY 
The subject of pre-invention transactional uncertainty has not 
yet been deeply explored in present literature.64
                                                                                                             
well as in using the patent as a sword against competitors that want to develop a 
competitor product). 
  This uncertainty is 
particularly prominent in the area of intellectual property, when 
there is no certainty whether ideas can be transferred into products 
or whether these products will succeed at all.  This uncertainty is, 
for example, endemic in the realm of patents, particularly in the 
development of medicines.  When the actual creation of the 
product, its final particulars, its economic worth, and whether it 
will gain patent protection is not known in advance, a situation 
fraught with risk emerges.  This section argues that an employee’s 
uncertainty as to the results of his or her creative efforts and his or 
64 See Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, 
Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 597 
(1993) (discussing the term “pre-invention”); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the 
“Fuel of Interests” from the “Fire of Genius”: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-
1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1998) (regarding employees who transfer their 
rights in future products to their employer under their employment contract); Robert 
Penchina, The Creative Commissioner: Commissioned Works Under the Copyright Act of 
1976, 62 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 373, 377 (1987) (concluding that the current law regarding 
works made-for-hire is confused and needs revision); Birnhack, supra note 19, at 125, 
154−55 (finding that the employer bears risk associated with making work). 
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her rights in the final product (or his or her knowledge that he or 
she will not have any such rights) coalesce to discourage him or 
her from going the extra mile in making a significant innovative 
effort. 
A. The Problems of Pre-Invention Uncertainty 
   Uncertainty is one of the central features of the contractual 
stage during which the employee knowingly or unknowingly 
waives his or her rights in future intellectual products from the 
outset of his or her employment. 64F 65 Such waivers are often 
sweeping and quite broad.  In a contractual arrangement known as 
a “pre-invention assignment agreement,” the employee makes a 
full transfer of rights to the employer.65F66 
Courts have typically upheld these contracts.66F67  It bears noting 
that the employee’s advance waiver of rights at the pre-invention 
stage differs from the employee’s de facto transfer of an existing 
intellectual product, which has its own specific problems.  The 
main problem in this regard is that, the employee usually has no 
knowledge of what he or she is waiving. 67F68 These engagements are 
made before employees are even aware of whether they will, in 
fact, produce anything or how much effort and investment will be 
required.  When the parties negotiate over rights in an invention or 
existing creation, neither party is fully aware of what they are 
                                                                                                             
65 See RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND 
COMMERCE (2000); Cherensky, supra note 64, at 617 (focusing on personality theory). 
66 See Parker A. Howell, Whose Invention Is It Anyway? Employee Invention-
Assignment Agreements And Their Limits, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 79, 80 (2012) 
(“Language in employment contracts requiring workers to assign to their employers any 
inventions conceived of during employment has become commonplace as businesses 
grow high-tech and experience frequent exchanges of employees.”). 
67 See cases cited supra note 14; see also Howell, supra note 66, at 81 (The “article 
examines the limits on contractual pre-invention assignment, using the Mattel litigation 
as a case study” and finding that even though limitations on pre-invention agreements 
exist, in some states, courts enforce pre-invention assignment agreements in favor of 
employers); Merges, supra note 19, at 7−8. 
68 See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role 
of Preinvention Assignment Agreement and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
163, 163−64 (1994) (“[T]he assignment of pre-invention rights, as opposed to the 
assignment of an existing invention, presents special contractual problems.  Since the 
invention has not yet materialized, the assignors or employees enter into an agreement 
without knowing exactly what they are potentially giving up.”). 
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receiving or what is being waived, for the employee transfers a 
collection of abstract rights that only reflects anticipation.  
Agreements of this kind can damage the creative process and the 
inventions themselves because they detract from the initial 
motivation to create.  Furthermore, even if an employee’s efforts 
bear fruit, he or she cannot be sure that others will necessarily 
derive any benefit from his or her product. 
Employers, on the other hand, have far more bargaining power 
in the initial contracting stages, which can all but ensure a 
complete transfer of rights.  They also possess the financial 
resources for funding, research, and development—they only lack 
resources for creativity.  Pre-invention contractual transfer 
arrangements tend to make sweeping transfers of all rights from 
employed inventors to employers. 69   In addition, pre-invention 
contractual transfer arrangements sometimes contain provisions 
known as “trailer clauses.”70
A recent economic study by Uri Weiss shows that uncertainty 
relating to extreme power discrepancies, in a manner that operates 
to the detriment of the weaker party, also detracts from the 
efficiency of the transaction. 70F71 The claim is that legal uncertainty 
is not neutral—it influences the “risk points” of the parties.  To the 
                                                                                                             
69 See Howell, supra note 66, at 80–81 (such pre-invention assignment clauses may 
purport to give an employer ownership of all an employee’s inventions, whereas statutes 
in some states, including California, Washington, and Minnesota, carve out significant 
limitations to these agreements). 
70 See Marc B. Hershovitz, Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Rights of Inventive 
Employees and their Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 188 (1995) (“A trailer clause 
is a contractual provision in which the employee-inventor agrees to assign his or her 
entire interest in any invention he creates during a period following the termination of the 
employment relationship.”). 
71 See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Appealability, HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF 
JERUSALEM, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RATIONALITY 1 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688877 (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (“There are sides that gain 
from increasing legal uncertainty and others that lose from it.  Legal uncertainty leads to 
regressive settlements: a shift from a more certain legal regime to a less certain one 
transfers weal from risk-averse parties to risk-neutral parties, via the settlements.”). 
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extent that one party is more risk averse, he or she will feel more 
threatened and agree in advance to a compromise that is more 
favorable to the risk-taking party. 71F 72 Such uncertainty generates 
regressive, inefficient agreements; as the uncertainty grows, so 
does its effects.  Given that risk aversion is a function of wealth, 
legal uncertainty is anathema to the financially weaker party.  
Research further shows that, where there are chances for an equal 
allocation of rights, such an allocation would not take place in an 
uncertain transaction (when the rules and likely results of litigation 
are uncertain). 72F73 
The conclusion is that under uncertain transactions even the 
mere possibility of equal allocation between parties, who hold 
different attitudes to risk, will not result in actual equal allocation 
of rights and goods.  The sum that the risk-averse party will agree 
to accept in lieu of litigation will be lower than the minimum price 
that the risk indifferent party would be prepared to pay for a 
waiver.73F74  Therefore, employees who are usually risk averse will 
seek to diminish the risk under uncertain conditions and hence, 
agree to lower consideration in rights or payment than they could 
have actually bargained for in certain conditions and with equal 
bargaining power.  A central mechanism for coping with legal 
uncertainty is by “freely” reaching a settlement agreement, one of 
the advantages of which is the neutralization of risk.  A settlement 
agreement provides a definite sum that provides a substitute to the 
uncertainty regarding the amount of the award.  A settlement 
agreement thus serves as quasi insurance.  A party sensitive to 
uncertainty will convert that uncertainty into the settlement 
agreement.  Concededly, the weaker party will receive a definite 
sum that is lower than the sum he or she might have received as a 
result of litigation, but because he or she is weak and risk averse, 
the definite sum is preferable to the possibility of a higher sum.  
Furthermore, the weaker party prefers “to pay” a higher sum of 
money in order to remove the threat of litigation.  Thus, to the 
                                                                                                             
72 See id. at 1, 6−9 (noting that a risk-neutral side actually sells an “insurance policy” 
to the risk-averse side; the higher the legal uncertainty, the higher the risk, and hence, the 
risk-averse side will agree to pay more in order to neutralize the legal risk). 
73 See id. at 2−3. 
74 See id. at 1, 6–9 (exploring appeals as a form of settlement to avoid litigation). 
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extent that the individual is more risk averse, he or she will be 
prepared to purchase a more expensive insurance policy from his 
or her rival.  As a result, the risk-averse party loses more by reason 
of his or her uncertainty, whereas the risk indifferent party profits 
thereby, and the profit margin of the latter increases in direct 
proportion to the degree of uncertainty.
  These clauses confer the employer 
with rights in intellectual products that were created in the course 
of the employee’s work, even if not directly in the work for which 
he or she was employed and even if created after the termination of 
his or her period of employment. 
75
Weiss’s study has direct implications upon my claims in this 
Article.  Under conditions of extreme uncertainty, it may 
reasonably be presumed that the employee will undervalue his or 
her rights and be prepared to receive far less in 
consideration/compensation. 75F76 In other words, it is expected that 
the employee-inventor will transfer or sell all rights in return for a 
“pot of lentils.”  The price of the transaction, especially at the pre-
invention stage, is unclear, and hence the waiver is likely to be 
uninformed.  The conclusions of this study support my proposed 
model, discussed in Part VI, which critiques the pr -invention
aiver. 
B. Allocation of Risks under Uncertainty 
The traditional explanatio  of risk allocation in the workplace 
is that the employer and the employee are located at different 
places on the spectrum—one which extends from neutrality to 
concern for risk.76F 77   The employer is closer to the extreme of 
neutrality concerning risks and uncertainty (risk neutrality) 
whereas the employee is closer to the extreme characterized by risk 
aversion (fear of risk and avoidance of uncertainty).77F 78   The 
contractual connection between the employee and employer with 
                                                                                                             
75 See id. at 9–15, 19–21 (asserting that the weaker the person, the more he or she 
prefers a lump sum over risk-taking). 
76 See Merges, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that in a position of uncertainty about 
future inventions and, “given the risk aversion typical of individuals, an employee would 
likely place a relatively low ex ante value on the right to this compensation.”). 
77 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43–48 (4th ed. 2004) 
(noting that employees are risk averse whereas employers are risk neutral). 
78 See Birnhack, supra note 19, at 140 (presenting the traditional approach to risk 
allocation by determining that, “the employer is in a better position to undertake the risks 
associated with producing [and commercializing the] work, [since the] typical production 
firm does not invest in one work only”); see also Merges, supra note 19, at 16 (stating 
that “employers . . . as a class, are more efficient bearers of this risk”). 
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respect to the development of intellectual products is characterized, 
as mentioned above, by uncertainty.
 
79
According to the traditional approach, the employee’s salary 
usually represents the willingness of employees to exchange their 
risk about the future for stable, lower payment and thus, 
externalizing the risk-averse employee’s costs to the employer.  
However, the payment represents the employee’s waiver of the 
chance for future profits at the price of ongoing payments in the 
present.
 
80  Being averse to risk, the employee will prefer a lower 
income on a permanent and certain basis over a higher, yet 
uncertain, potential gain.  Alternative payment terms with inherent 
uncertainty, such as percentages of product sales, while waiving a 
permanent salary, are generally anathema to the risk averse.81  The 
employer “buys” intellectual property rights in the product because 
he assumes the risk involved in the creation, development, and 
marketing of IP products.  The employee is regarded as having 
“sold” his or her rights in return for a salary.82
                                                                                                             
79 See Merges, supra note 
  Hence, the sides 
19, at 16 (“[T]he parties to such a contract would have to 
sign it before any details of the invention were known – indeed, before anyone knew 
whether a particular employee would ever invent anything at all.”). 
80 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 130 (3d ed. 
2003). 
81 The risk-averse person prefers to give up a certain amount rather than face the 
unknown. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 77, at 38–51, 53 (“One of the most important 
behavioral implications of risk aversion are that people will pay money to avoid having to 
face uncertain outcomes.  In other words, a risk-averse person would rather have a lower 
certain income than a higher uncertain income.”); see also Birnhack, supra note 19, at 
154-55 (adopting the traditional approach that there is a trade-off of risks between 
employer and employee; employee chooses not to be independent and to work for 
specific employer); CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION 
AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930, 178–88 (Univ. N.C. 
Press 2009) (arguing that modern intellectual property law provides for unprecedented 
formalization of corporate power over all aspects of employment and production). 
82 See Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App.3d 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th D. 1986) (arguing 
that the rights regarding works which employees develop belong to the firm that invested, 
either directly or indirectly, in the development of that invention); Merges, supra note 16, 
at 30–31 (“[B]y taking a salary, R&D personnel are revealing a preference for relatively 
low-risk rewards.”). 
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virtually trade risks.83  The employer, for its part, “buys” the future 
risk from the employee for potential future rights in IP goods.84
This traditional risk analysis favoring the employer is, 
however, subject to a number of criticisms.
 
85
The second criticism of the risk trading argument is that it 
ignores the risks that employee-inventors (including ETI) take 
upon themselves when developing their internal resources in favor 
of their employers.  Both the employee and the employer take a 
risk at the pre-invention stage before the development of a product.  
The employer provides economic activity whereas the employee 
specializes in inventive-creative activity.  Attention is usually 
focused on risks that employers take.
  First, the risk model 
described is only appropriate for employees who are employed to 
invent (ETI).  Even then, its individual applicability should be 
examined on an ad-hoc basis.  It should not be applied to general 
non-ETI employees such as engineers or doctors.  The model has 
no applicability to those employees, as there is no risk-allocation 
between employer and employee with respect to the invention.  
Thus, a distinction should be made between an ETI employee and 
a general employee whose salary is not provided as a reward for 
inventive or creative activity.  In these cases, the “risk trading” 
argument does not apply. 
86   However, the employee 
invests in one asset only—his or her own human capital.  When the 
employee chooses a central place of work, he or she is taking risk 
by investing all of his or her human capital in this one place.  As an 
employee, he or she is limited in his or her ability to spread the 
investments in a number of companies. 87
                                                                                                             
83 See Orbach, supra note 
  The employer’s 
investment, on the other hand, is spread among a greater number of 
19, at 37–38 (citing trade risk as an important factor in 
evaluating the efficient regulation of service work). 
84 Id. 
85 See Parker, supra note 7, at 627 (raising the criticism that inventors, as well as non-
R&D employees, run the risk that employers will either fail or refuse to develop an 
invention). 
86 See POLINSKY, supra note 80 (discussing the limitation of liability afforded to 
shareholders, which both allows and encourages them to take risks in business activity). 
87 See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for 
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 605, 606 (1981) (asserting that because 
“human capital cannot be traded in competitive markets,” managers may diversify 
employment risk through mergers). 
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factors; employees, machines, equipment and development.88
Third, the risk-trading model does not necessarily ensure 
optimal efficiency.  Because it bears the brunt of the economic 
risk, the employer may prefer not to secure the employee’s rights 
in the product or its subsequent royalties, even at the expense of a 
low level of employee investment and, therefore, a lower level of 
productivity. 
  This 
is most obvious with large and well-established employers and less 
so among small and medium enterprises.  When employee-
inventors pass their ideas on to the specific employer, they run the 
risk of the employer not sufficiently valuing their ideas and failing 
to develop them.  This may hold up promotion at work or affect 
future economic potential.  From the moment of transferring an 
idea to the employer and fixing it in an external medium, the 
employee loses his or her rights in his or her own thoughts under 
the current regime. 
Fourth, the traditional risk analysis favoring the employer may 
no longer be applicable in a start-up era where employees 
themselves may be highly risk-seeking rather than risk-averse.  
The assumption that employees are risk averse mischaracterizes a 
large group of employee-inventors who choose to leave a firm and 
strike out on their own, developing products by themselves or with 
other entities.  In the new world of tech start-ups, these can easily 
gather investment and establish their own firms.  In many cases, 
the likelihood of developing the ideas into tradable products is 
greater than the allocation of these ideas to firms.  However, the 
pro-employer tendency does not encourage cooperation between 
employees and their former employer. 
As start-ups grow in success, it is likely that more employees 
will turn to investors and seek to develop products themselves.  An 
analysis of employer-employee risk allocation is far from precise 
under an economic framework wherein economic investments may 
be made at a relatively early stage of the development process.  A 
large portion of the modern “start-up” economy in the 
                                                                                                             
88 See generally Thorstein Veblen, On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangivle 
Assets, and the Pecuniary Magnate, 23 Q. J. ECON. 104 (1908), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1883967 (discussing the nature of investment in both tangible 
and intangible assets toward the goal of capital gain). 
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technological realm is based on small and medium size 
entrepreneurs.  Most, if not all of them, were once employees in 
other companies, but they are not risk averse as demonstrated from 
their entrepreneurial willingness. 88F 89 Thus, the theory of rights 
allocation being a function of risk allocation does not apply to 
them.  Rather, these entrepreneurs should be rewarded, instead of 
punished for their efforts. 
The distinction between the entrepreneur-employee who 
welcomes risk and the risk-averse employee—for whom ensuring 
an appropriate salary is more efficient in comparison to the 
allocation of property rights—is by no means simple.  In cases 
involving entrepreneurial employees, the granting of property 
rights should be viewed as the desirable way to give risk-seeking, 
creative workers property rights in their products. 
Rethinking the prevailing norm from this perspective reveals 
new opportunities for development of innovative products by 
simply allocating rights in a new product developed by a former 
employee after he or she has left the firm to that former employee, 
even when the ideas that led to the invention are rooted at the 
former place of employment. 89F90  In other words, former employees 
should be credited with property rights, as new entrepreneurs, for 
ideas they have developed themselves.  Courts should adopt new 
policy regarding non-compete clauses in employment agreements 
allocating ideas of employees to their former employer.  I have 
chosen to call this rule the “escape clause.”  In other words, in 
situations where the “escape clause” would apply, courts would 
simply strike down the relevant provisions of the pre-invention 
contract that endows a former employer with the rights to a 
product developed after an employee has left the firm. 
C. The Efficient User 
I have argued throughout this Part that, although the traditional 
law and economics approach views the employer as the more 
                                                                                                             
89 ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A 
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 3–4 (2003) (defining the Silicon Valley as a high 
velocity labor market characterized by frequent mobility and entrepreneurship paths). 
90 I further claim that the service invention rule today should be reconsidered in order 
to promote more cooperation between the employee-inventors and the (former) employer. 
166 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:140 
 
efficient user/holder of patent rights under conditions of 
uncertainty,91 there may be cases, instead, where the employee is 
the efficient exploiter of an intellectual property product. 92  
Allocation of property rights to employees may be more efficient 
where it concerns the recycling of works.  The rationale is to 
spread the cost of funding new IP products based on former ones.  
Examples, taken mainly from copyright regime, include teachers, 
poets, planners, and architects whose ability to revise and rework 
their creations means that the full conferral of the rights to them 
will be more economically efficient (as opposed to being required 
to receive the approval of the IP owner each time anew).93  In these 
cases, as is the practice among architects, the final client is 
“subsidized” by the previous client.94  An architect will create a 
plan for a new client based on an existing plan, which he or she 
had already invested in creating.95
                                                                                                             
91 See supra text accompanying notes 
  These examples also apply to 
inventors, for whom new inventions or new modifications are built 
on top of previous ones.  A scientist or engineer, for example, can 
adapt his or her invention to new situations with greater efficiency 
than the institution or those on its behalf.  Thus, the allocation of 
rights to the employer may prevent the employees from using the 
products they developed when moving forward.  However, this 
rationale should not apply to an employer who utilizes the products 
76–84. 
92 See Posner, supra note 19, at 37–45 (reasoning that copyright laws protect the cost 
of creating subsequent works). 
93 See Orbach, supra note 19, at 57–58 (suggesting that sometimes the author, and not 
the transferee, is the more efficient user of the work). 
94 Architects generally license their plans to builders or developers, usually for a single 
use, retaining all rights to the design and drawings. See WERNER SABO, LEGAL GUIDE TO 
AIA DOCUMENTS 123-124 (5th ed. 2013), citing LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia 
Homes of Nevada, 434 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting preliminary injunction against 
a developer who reused an architect’s plans without permission, in breach of the written 
agreement between the architect and the client). 
95 It is a common practice for architects to re-use their prior work, and the practice is 
typically protected by contract.  However, clients who seek (and think they are paying 
for) exclusivity are sometimes surprised by the practice. See ARCHINECT DISCUSSION 
FORUM: Our Custom Plans Resold . . . Is This Ethical? at 
http://archinect.com/forum/thread/65444889/our-custom-plans-resold-is-this-ethical (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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in an effective and efficient manner.  In such a case it is more 
effective to transfer the property right to the employer. 95F96 
This compels a rethinking of the arrangement in view of the 
doctrine of the most efficient user.  One solution may lie in the ab 
initio vesting of property rights in the employee, which would be 
passed to the employer subject to certain conditions, such as the 
cancellation of such transfer and a restoration to the employee in 
the event of the employer’s failure to exploit the product.  A 
number of proposals were submitted to Congress to enact a law 
under which the employee would receive the property rights in his 
or her invention in certain circumstances.96F97  For example, proposed 
amendments to American Patent law suggested that inventions 
would belong to the employee who conceived it in situations 
where, inter alia, the employer failed to file an application to 
register a patent (a constructive abandonment). 97F 98 This solution 
would streamline the development of products and the use thereof, 
giving the employee an incentive to produce and promote the 
product the employee created.  Mechanisms that abrogate IP rights 
by reason of non-use on the part of their owners are accepted in 
other areas of IP.98F 99   A trademark owner, for example, can 
“abandon” his or her mark and thus lose rights to it.99F100  It may also 
be possible to consider a proposal incorporating the idea of an 
“efficient breach,” thus allowing employees who develop an 
intellectual product the rights to that product while ensuring that 
the employer is properly compensated. 100F101 
                                                                                                             
96 In the well-known Tasini judgment, concerning the rights to publish journalists’ 
articles in other media, the majority rejected the opinion concerning the efficient user. 
See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (reasoning that the 
effective exploiter can acquire the rights from the less efficient side in the free market).  I 
suggest that the employer can buy the rights in a free market from the employee-inventor 
if the employer is the better user. 
97 See, e.g., The Bayh-Dole Act, H.R. 6933, 96th Cong. (1980) (providing inventors 
with intellectual property rights when working pursuant to a federal research funding 
contract or grant). 
98 Kastenmeier Bill Oct. 13, 1981 (97th H.R. 4732); Katsenmeier Bill June 17, 
1982 (97th H.R.6636) (Resubmitted as June 13, 1983 98th H.R. 3285). 
99 See, e.g., The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (codifying the conditions under which 
a mark will be deemed to have been abandoned). 
100 Id. 
101 See Turner, supra note 63, at 196–201 (promoting efficient infringement through the 
use of liability rules). 
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This Section of the Article focused on the uncertainty 
surrounding the transaction of IP rights from the employed 
inventor to the employer.  The next will continue this discussion 
focusing innovatively on “Principal-Agent” theory. 
III. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
In order to decide on the most efficient policy regarding 
workplace inventions, one must look at the special characteristics 
of the workplace.  We can analogize to another model that has 
gained attention in the corporate law literature, but not yet in the 
context discussed: the Principal-Agent relationship.  For our 
purposes, the employer is the principal and the employee is the 
agent.  A principal-agent relationship is most often characterized as 
a “contract under which one or more (principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent.”102
A problematic situation arises when the employee, as an agent, 
prefers his or her own personal interests over those of the 
employer.  Take for example the case of an employee in an ice-
cream shop.  The employee might prefer to eat the ice-cream, close 
the shop as early as possible, and bring ice-cream to his or her 
friends, rather than to safeguard the employer’s interests, 
especially when the employee is not subject to any supervision. 
 
The fear is that the employee may prefer activities that 
minimize the degree of effort required while maximizing personal 
benefits.  Understandably, the employee may well prefer his or her 
own interest at the expense of the interest the employee is 
supposed to represent, and the greater the gap between these 
interests, the greater the conflict.103
                                                                                                             
102 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
  Additional characteristics of 
this gap are the discrepancies between the employer and the 
employee in their levels of knowledge and the lack of visibility in 
the activity of the employee.  Specifically in the context of 
employee-inventions, the employer does not always know how 
103 See id. 
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much the employee invested—particularly intellectually—in the 
development of an invention even though it has been developed at 
the workplace. 
This problem founded on the agent’s interests exists in the area 
of corporate law, but I believe that the problem becomes most 
acute in the context of employee-inventors.  The distinction 
between the employer who carries out the business activity and the 
employee who creates or invents gives rise to the concern that the 
employee will avoid the development and creation at the level, 
quality, and quantity expected of him.  This conflict may be 
expressed in the lack of efficiency in the development of products, 
the result of which will be a decrease in the quantity and quality of 
intellectual products developed in the workplace.  The employee-
inventor may make a minimal investment of effort (similar to the 
ice-cream seller in the previous example) and may develop a 
minimal level of intellectual products (only the degree which is 
required to prevent him or her from being fired) and then likely to 
tend to his or her own interests.  When discussing employed 
inventors, it might be impossible in many cases to examine the 
depth of the mental-intellectual investment required for purposes 
of development, creation, and monitoring.  Further, the more 
workers there are on a team, the more difficult it becomes to 
monitor the individual contribution that each one of them makes to 
the work. 
In the context of intellectual property, the Principal-Agent 
problem concretizes the concern that the employee-inventor will 
prefer personal interests over the property interests of his or her 
employer and therefore, is not as incentivized to create to his or her 
full potential.  The solution to this problem stresses the importance 
of conferring rights or other benefits to the employee not just as a 
means of promoting development, but also to block obstructions 
that may interfere with that development process (for example, 
preferring other tasks).  The solution is anchored in the concept 
that it is more efficient to ensure optimal innovation than to bear 
the dangers attendant to inefficiency in the development of 
products.  Jensen and Meckling suggested a number of solutions to 
the Principal-Agency problem, which they referred to as “agency 
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costs.”104  These costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs and 
residual costs (the reduction in welfare experienced by the 
principal as a result of this divergence).105
One solution to the representative problem is to tighten up 
monitoring mechanisms.
  As mentioned, these 
solutions merit discussion in the present context. 
106   This solution, however, is not 
effective in the context of inventors and creators due to the 
invisibility of their mental investment.  The installation of a video 
camera or supervision of computer usage, for example, would 
provide little insight into how much thought and mental effort were 
invested in the ideas that preceded development (such as the 
reading and understanding of material or the depth of thought and 
intellectual effort that were invested).  Another method of 
monitoring the work of employee-inventors could be indirect 
monitoring through evaluation of the eventual products 
developed.107
The alternative mechanism for solving the conflict of interests 
within employed inventors’ work is the bonding mechanism, 
which links the employee to the product.
  However, the problem here is that, when there is a 
group of employee-inventors, the visibility of the investment of 
each one of the group’s individual employees would be even less 
apparent and therefore, hard to evaluate and monitor.  In sum, the 
mechanisms for monitoring development are less effective when 
the creative-inventive part of the product is significant and the 
development team comprises numerous employees. 
108  By connecting the 
employee to the product, the personal interest of the employee 
becomes the development of the product, and this “bonding” 
reduces the gap between the employee’s interest and the 
employer’s interest.109
                                                                                                             
104 Id. 
  As a result of the “bond,” the employee 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (introducing monitoring as a solution to the representative problem). 
107 Toby Marshall Egan, Factors Influencing Individual Creativity in the Workplace: 
An Examination of Quantitative Empirical Research, 7 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPING 
HUMAN RESOURCES 169 (2005). 
108 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 102, at 325 (discussing bonding as a solution to the 
representative problem). 
109 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 108, at 325–26 (describing the phenomenon in 
terms of “bonding costs” and using other examples). 
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becomes more committed to the employer and the work itself.  
Having a personal interest in the work, the employee operates in 
order to maximize his or her personal interest in a manner that may 
be consistent with the interests of society as a whole.110
The payment of salary only will not necessarily solve these 
problems because, within the context of employee-inventions, an 
employee might work only to maintain this salary without putting 
in any extra work.  An effective mechanism must connect the 
employee to the product itself.  As more rights are conferred upon 
the employee, the inventor’s personal interest in product 
development will increase.  However, conferral of rights must take 
into consideration additional factors.  Agency costs must be less 
than the benefit bestowed upon the employer.  If one gives all of 
the rights to the employee, it is clear that the employer will lose all 
interest it had in product development, which will inevitably come 
to a standstill.  I conclude that consideration must also be had for 
the parties’ respective degrees of risk aversion because the 
development and commercialization of intellectual products 
involves a significant degree of uncertainty.
 Giving a 
bonus to the employee for each sale is an example of a method to 
spur the bonding that firms should desire to create.  Conferral of 
rights in intellectual inventions to employee-inventors can also 
encourage them to promote the development process and invest 
their best efforts in doing so.  In addition, it reduces the danger of 
employees channeling their efforts towards the promotion of their 
own interests, such as alternative projects. 
111
In summary, the Principal-Agency model may provide further 
insight in developing an appropriate solution to the problem of 
how to best ensure an employee-inventor can fulfill his maximum 
potential in developing intellectual property. Specifically, giving 
the employee incentives intrinsically linked to the product itself, 
preferably through property rights, aside from the payment of a 
regular salary will help ensure that an employee’s interest can stay 
aligned with an employer’s. 
 
                                                                                                             
110 Carolyn Wiley, What Motivates Employees According to Over 40 Years of 
Motivation Surveys,18 INT’L J. MANPOWER 263–80 (1997) (noting that employees 
overwhelmingly selected “good wages” as their top motivator). 
111 See discussion supra Part II. 
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Allocation of options and equity shares in the employer’s firm 
to employees may also provide such an incentive.  A number of 
arguments have, however, been made against the offering of 
employee shares or options as a solution to the Principal-Agency 
problem. 112   The value of the shares, for example, is not 
necessarily connected to the performance of those entitled to them.  
The commercial value of shares depends upon the commercial 
success of the company, which is only tenuously related to the 
specific activity of the employee, that is, development of 
intellectual products. 113   Even if there is a certain connection 
between commercial activity and the end-product, activities like 
the marketing and sale of the product are not within the control of 
the employee who developed the product.  In that situation, the 
value of the shares will not reflect the commercial potential of the 
product, and as such, the incentive itself will bear only a tenuous 
relation to the product, rendering it ineffective.114
The conclusion emerging from these critiques, in my view, is 
that from the outset, a connection should be established between 
the employee and his or her outputs.  In the realm of intellectual 
property, this means rewarding inventors by giving them property 
rights and/or royalties to a degree and in a manner that reflects and 
is linked to the success of the products developed or to be 
developed. 
 
The foregoing discussion of the importance of analyzing the 
employee/employer relationship from the principal/agent 
perspective leads to the conclusion that the bonding solution 
should be one of the main components involved in shaping a new 
policy for enhancing innovative productivity. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
112 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 16–17 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9784, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9784.pdf (asserting that options are often an inefficient way 
to attract, retain, and motivate executives). 
113 Id. at 16. 
114 An additional claim concerns the difficulty of quantifying the value of options 
conferred upon the employee. See id. at 7-9 (describing the complex tax and accounting 
rules of stock options). 
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IV. WHOSE INCENTIVES SHOULD WE PROMOTE? 
A. Rethinking Employers’ Incentives 
In discussing rights allocation for employee inventions 
developed in the workplace, it must be stressed that investment in 
future products is a function, not only of the employer’s resources, 
but is also a reflection of the employee’s investment and expenses, 
such as intellectual effort or academic knowledge.  The economic 
justifications for both sides’ investment in product development 
stems from the assumption that the anticipated benefit of the 
product, although still unknown, will be greater than its present 
and anticipated expenses.  In formulating a policy for the 
appropriate allocation of rights, we assume that each party has an 
incentive to incur the necessary expenses under uncertain 
conditions regarding future outcomes.115  On the one hand, if all 
rights are given to the employee, the employer lacks the incentive 
to invest in necessary infrastructure vital to the creative process.  
On the other hand, giving all of the rights to the employer leaves 
the employee with a diminished incentive to make any exceptional 
future investment apart from maintaining a salary based on 
minimal efforts insufficient for increasing innovation.116
The ideal solution must therefore be based on a better 
understanding of the respective interests of both sides at each 
phase of product development.  However, the traditional approach 
usually prefers only one side in allocating intellectual property 
rights, namely the employer.
 
117
Most scholars support this view under an economic 
justification.
 
118   Such scholars start from the premise that 
economic efficiency is achieved by granting an incentive that 
maximizes benefit, including the profit from a product, which 
leads to maximum exploitation. 119
                                                                                                             
115 See Robert Gibbons, Incentives in Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 116 
(1998) (describing the incentive structure of the agency model of employment). 
  According to this approach, 
116 See id. 
117 Orbach, supra note 19, at 2 (“[T]he law that governs the allocation of rights in 
creative products produced at the workplace . . . favors employers.”). 
118 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
119 Posner, supra note 19, at 33 (arguing that individual property rights are necessary 
for efficient allocation of resources). 
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labor, including the development of intellectual goods, is a process 
that requires the investment of tremendous resources, such as 
work, talent, effort, and capital.  No rational actor will make the 
necessary investment without the expectation of some kind of 
profit, especially during the early uncertain phase before the 
developmental process has even begun. 120   Incentivizing 
intellectual property production is provided either by conferring 
the inventor with future property rights at the exclusion of others 
for a limited period of time or by other appropriate 
compensation.121  The current policy is based on the assumption 
that a categorical rule that allocates all rights exclusively to the 
employer will encourage employers to contribute their part to the 
development of intellectual product. 122   Employers accelerate 
economic activity in the market by promoting the development of 
intellectual products.123  This important activity is motivated by the 
expectation of receiving “extra” rights after the return of costs and 
payments that were invested by themselves and others.124
Moreover, unlike past scenarios, where the heroic individual 
inventor was the sole person involved in the development process, 
today the inventive process frequently requires greater 
involvement by employers.
 
125  The employer’s role includes, inter 
alia, its preliminary initiative in launching the development 
process in an area with which it is familiar, its integration among 
all relevant players, and the employer’s sources of investment and 
assets provided for the purpose of producing the product, including 
funding the team of employees that supports development, and the 
funding of equipment.126
                                                                                                             
120 See id. at 38 (giving numeric examples regarding expected profit). 
121 See id. 
122 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
123 Id. 
124 See Posner, supra note 19, at 44 (“[T]he economic benefits of investing in 
intellectual property are not exhausted in the initial creation of the property.”). 
125 See Fisk, supra note 81, at 179–80 (“Both invention and entrepreneurship became 
corporate.”). 
126 Merges, supra note 19, at 2–3 (arguing that employers invest in the R&D process as 
well as carry the risk of the process). 
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during the development process, while funding the ongoing work 
of employees, funding the means of production and the work 
environment; and (iii) after development is completed by 
distribution of the product and negotiations for granting a usage 
license and enforcement of rights.
  The employer is thus regarded as the 
driving economic force (i) in the development process, when 
enlisting employees and building the necessary infrastructure; (ii) 
127
I posit that the claim that it is efficient to allocate property 
rights to employers to motivate them to develop and create future 
intellectual goods, which although may seem both reasonable and 
logical on its face, is in fact replete with doubts.  Conferring all 
rights to employers does not necessarily incentivize firms to 
engage in additional future activities to develop intellectual 
property.  Scholars have claimed that alternate incentives and 
commercial protection play a greater role than firms’ patent 
protection in corporate decisions of whether to create and 
develop.127F128  Indeed, studies have shown that firms prefer to guard 
inventions as a trade secret as opposed to registering them as a 
patent.128F129  Many firms also use patent protection, not only for the 
purpose of developing their inventions, but also to block their 
competitors.   129F130Firms have reported that patent protection was the 
last factor in their decision as to whether to invest in research and 
development.130F131  To the contrary, being the first to break into the 
market serves as a major factor in incentivizing development of a 
new product.131F132  It is therefore quite p ssible that g anting property
                                                                                                             
127 See id.; see also Patchett v. Sterling, [1955] R.P.C. 50, 56-57 (H.L.) (holding that 
rights to go the employer as a default rule). 
128 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 63, at 187. 
129 Submitting a patent application, in contrast to maintaining the idea as a trade secret, 
means revealing the idea behind the patent and, if the patent is ultimately confirmed, it 
means limiting the duration of the patent protection. Turner, supra note 63, at 188–89. 
130 Turner, supra note 63, at 188–89 (asserting that first-to-market, rather than patent 
protection, is the main incentive to R&D). 
131 See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 6278–29 (3d ed. 1990) (concluding that expected profits even absent 
patent protection are often sufficient for continued product development). 
132 Id. (discussing the advantages attaching to being the first to break into the market 
and the use of trade secrets as substitute mechanisms for the patent system). 
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rights to employees in appropriate cases would not significantly 
detract from employers’ incentive, which mostly relies on 
alternative mechanisms for gaining commercial advantage.  
Conferral of rights based on a motivational rationale may actually 
play in favor of employees, given that individuals require legal 
protection and are influenced by it in the absence of alternative 
protection.
  The question that mains
concerns the other parameters of the developme tal process: Does
this one-sided allocation of rights provide sufficient motivation to 
the inventors during the early stage of the process where 
uncertainty reigns? 
133
Conceivably, an incentive in the form of absolute property 
rights, given ab initio to the employer, is overly broad.  Alternative 
routes might be taken which could minimize the derogation of 
inventor-employees’ rights and hence stimulate overall 
productiveness.  For example, were the rights to be conferred to 
the employee, the employer would be able to purchase the rights 
therein from the employee at a later stage after the development of 
the product has been completed and when the product is shown to 
be “promising” in quantifiable terms.  Another possible 
arrangement would be to grant usage licenses to the employer.
  Employee-inventors requir ign f cant incentives in
order to enrich their intellectual products for the ben fit of th
public as a whole.  It thus emerges that a policy which grants 
exclusive rights to employers does so in a manner that does not 
necessarily reflect optimal efficiency. 
134
In summary, I claim that the current property regime is not the 
only possible regime and might not even be the most efficient one.  
Indeed, alternative possibilities have not been given serious 
  
Furthermore, in my view, the employee involved in a “start-up” 
era, as described in Part II, would be more strongly motivated than 
the former employer and would have the monetary ability to 
develop the intellectual product and to protect its rights, as it is his 
or her main asset. 
                                                                                                             
133 See Turner, supra note 63, at 187 (regarding small, independent inventors, who are 
not in the position to take advantage of alternative incentives). 
134 But see Hovell, supra note 7 (claiming that the contractual solution bears transaction 
costs and may lead to inefficient allocation of rights and the concealment of information 
by employers). See generally LYNNE MILLWARD, UNDERSTANDING OCCUPATIONAL & 
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 188–243 (2005) (offering a more complex view of 
motivation of employees from psychological personality perspective). 
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consideration.134F135  The “rights” regime should be reconsidered with 
a view to broadening the category of potential beneficiaries of 
intellectual property rights. 135F 136  Perhaps the law and economics 
theory ignores the nature and burden of the creative process from 
the inventor’s perspective. 136F137 After all, the individual motivation 
problem is one of the principal concerns in current discourse 
concerning the appropriate allocation of intellectual property in 
general, and specifically in IP products developed within the 
workplace. 137F 138  The progress of technology is dependent upon 
contributions made by individuals in solving problems. 138F 139  It is 
therefore important to encourage individuals to create and commit 
                                                                                                             
135 See SCHERER, supra note 131, at 444–46 (discussing the advantages attached to 
being the first to break into the market and the use of trade secrets as a substitute 
mechanism for the patent system). 
136 See, e.g., Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 
206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the absence of a contractual 
agreement, there is an assumption that the title to the copyright belongs to the person who 
initiated and funded the work rather than automatically belonging to the employer). 
137 See Cherensky, supra note 64 (focusing on the implications of Professor Margaret 
Radin’s theory about property and personhood for service invention laws and how private 
contractual agreements have mooted the attempt at balancing the interests of both the 
employer and employee); Yuval Feldman, An Experimental Approach to the Study of 
Social Norms: The Allocation of Intellectual Property Rights in the Workplace, 10 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 59, 69 (2002) (discussing psychological perspectives of employee’s 
invention while asserting that most law and economics scholars believe that proprietary 
rights should go to the employer; also rejects the rationality assumption of efficiency as 
the dominant factor underlying economic theory). 
138 See Posner, supra note 19, at 37–40 (discussing how the patent system is limited by 
five sub-mechanisms in order to reduce costs, thereby enhancing motivation to develop 
patents: (1) expirations for patents (2) strict criteria for registration of patents (an obvious 
invention cannot be patentable, despite the investment in its development), (3) granting 
patents before the product is ready to go into the trade market to avoid duplicates, (4) 
criteria that the invention is useful, and (5) fundamental concepts, such as laws of 
physics, are not patentable).  On the incentive of firms in general, see Gibbons, supra 
note 87; Canice Prendergast, The Provision of Incentives in Firms, 37 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 7 (1999).  With regard to discourse in relation to employee’s invention, see 
Dratler, supra note 23 for the importance of motivation to research and developments 
employees. See also Neal Orkin, Rewarding Employee Invention: Time for a Change, 62 
HARV. BUS. REV. 56 (1984). 
139 See Dratler, supra note 23 (discussing the importance of the motivation factor in 
patents development); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098 
(1972) (“There are also preferences which are linked to dynamic efficiency concepts – 
producers ought to be rewarded since they will cause everyone to be better off in the 
end.”). 
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themselves to new ideas, for otherwise technology and progress 
will not develop at the accelerated rate that is imperative during 
times of crises. 
Joseph Stiglitz claimed that the slowdown at the end of the 
twentieth century has its source in the absence of technological 
changes which, itself, was the result of the absence of 
incentives.139F140  The solution, in his view, is to be found in one of 
two paths: Government support for research and development, by 
virtue of investments or tax breaks, or rewarding those responsible 
for creation and development in order to promote productive 
activity—i.e., by allocating additional rights to employees apart 
from their salary. 140F141 
Mary La France has also pointed out other problematic aspects 
of allocating all rights to employers.  For example, she has claimed 
that a law passed in the state of Nevada, ostensibly to broaden 
employees’ rights, instead broadened rights of employers. 141F142  The 
law automatically granted the employer intellectual property rights 
in any employee invention conceived in the course of work unless 
agreed otherwise. 142F 143   La France has shown that this law 
discouraged worker immigration to Nevada and caused them to 
prefer other states such as California or Washington where the 
legal position was more favorable in terms of employees’ rights (at 
least, that employers who wished to gain IP rights in employee 
work product had to explicitly contract for it).143F144  This result was 
quite the opposite of the intended goal, which was to stimulate 
technological growth in Nevada.144F145  On the contrary, studies have 
shown that states with high technology growth, like California and 
Washington, are specifically ones that have passed laws 
                                                                                                             
140 See STIGLITZ, supra note 52. 
141 Id. 
142 Mary LaFrance, Nevada’s Employee Inventions Statute: Novel, Nonobvious and 
Patently Wrong, 3 NEV. L.J. 88, 88–90 (2002). 
143 See id. at 88, 107–14 (asserting that the law in Nevada which broadens employer 
property rights in any employee invention might encourage workers to prefer other 
states). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 108. 
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broadening employees’ rights and restricting employers’ ability to 
contract around this.146
When employees are not rewarded, employee-inventors may 
opt for one of the following options: (i) avoidance of development 
of IP products; (ii) development of products that comply with the 
minimum standards for satisfactory discharging of employees’ 
duties; (iii) smuggling of significant IP outside of the organization; 
or (iv) as suggested in this sub-section, preference of a workplace 
in a different location that ensures, by legislation, better benefits to 
employed inventors. 
 
B. The Many Stages of Incentivized and Creative Employees 
Understanding the varying levels of motivation furthers 
awareness of the need to increase employees’ motivations, 
especially under conditions of uncertainty.   Motivation in the 
context of intellectual property can be divided into various stages: 
(1) The incentive to invent and create.  The assumption is 
that the rules of intellectual property should supply the incentive 
required to promote inventions and the creative process in 
general. 147
(2) Incentive to innovate.  This incentive should not only 
motivate employee-inventors to invent, but also to break new 
ground inventing significant welfare-promoting and successful 
inventions.  Establishing the exclusivity of incentives for creative 
employees will motivate them to innovate in a manner that leads to 
meaningful added value for society, and for which society should 
  The investment required for especially creative 
products that demand exceptional intellectual resources of the 
inventors compel a commensurate incentive for the employee.  In 
the absence of a special incentive, no ground-breaking and unique 
inventions can be expected for the benefit of all.  This claim gains 
even more force where it relates to the pre-invention stage. 
                                                                                                             
146 Id. 
147 See Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) (“[B]oth the United States Constitution and judicial 
decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying intellectual 
property.”). 
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pay a price.148
(3) Incentive to disclose.  Any intellectual product has its 
source in the inner recesses of a person’s mind, which must make 
its way to the external world in order to garner protection and bear 
fruit.  Indeed, disclosure serves a number of roles: it enables the 
transition from the stage of an idea, which is not protected by the 
laws of intellectual protection, to that of a protectable product.  
Thus, disclosure is an essential element of the law of intellectual 
property because it forms the basis of the “transaction” between 
the creator and the public, whereby the public grants creators an 
exclusive right for a limited period of time in exchange for such 
disclosure.  Specifically, encouraging disclosure is of particular 
importance in the context of employees.
  Any invention should be new and innovative, but it 
is clear that there should also be a direct relationship between our 
desire for creativity and our willingness to provide greater 
incentives for the same. 
149
(4) Incentive to commercialize and distribute the product.  
Motivation should also be related to the commercialization of the 
product, its distribution, and the deriving of profits therefrom.  The 
employee plays a crucial role at the development and creation 
stage.  The talent, genius, and reflection of personality, to the 
extent that they are expressed in the intellectual product, mainly 
stem from the employee-inventor.  The importance of the 
employee does not, however, end at the development stage, but 
  Without appropriate 
incentives, employees will prefer not to disclose their thoughts to 
the employer, since all rights may ultimately be transferred to the 
employer.  The commercial potential of the invention may serve as 
an incentive for hiding it from the employer until the stage at 
which the employee can develop it independently.  From a public 
perspective, this kind of thinking is problematic because it prevents 
the efficient connection between the employer’s capital and 
commercial power, and the creative potential of the employee. 
                                                                                                             
148 Bartow, supra note 23, at 3 n.12 (“[I]ndividuals work hardest when they stand to 
personally gain from their efforts.  The same principle applies to motivating creative 
people.” (quoting Ron Riley, Inventors Deserve Their Fair Share, Machine Design, Mar. 
21, 1994 at 109)). 
149 See FISK, supra note 81, at 180–81 (discussing how firms developed legal tools to 
control employees’ creativity). 
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rather continues after the product has appeared in the real world. 
149F
150 Even at this stage, it is important to encourage the inventor to 
cooperate with the employer and with third parties who are seeking 
to purchase rights in the product.  The latter parties require the 
employee’s help in registering a patent, adjusting a product for a 
particular client, introducing required changes in the product, 
explaining the product, and marketing the product.  It is frequently 
necessary to also have the employee’s cooperation with future 
projects, and it is therefore important to encourage the employee to 
“stay in the picture” even after termination of the instant project. 
V. WHY THE (“FREE”) MARKET IS INSUFFICIENT 
A. Differences in Bargaining Power Between the Parties 
The basic assumption in the economic analysis of employee-
employer relations is that the employee is the weaker party due to 
differences in negotiating power, accessibility to relevant 
information (both legal and economic), respective levels of control 
of financial resources, and accessibility to the legal system in order 
to enforce one’s rights. 150F151 These power differences become even 
more pronounced at the pre-invention stage, during which 
employees are usually required to waive their rights in exchange 
for a steady income and the promise of job security.  I claim that a 
                                                                                                             
150 Dratler, supra note 23, at 137, 168–73 (describing the phases of the development 
process of intellectual property products, which involve many factors). 
151 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort 
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 
MD L. REV. 563, 563, 614–24 (1982) (“[D]istributive and paternalist motives . . . explain 
far better than any notion of rectifying unequal bargaining power the widespread legal 
institution of compulsory contract terms in areas such as the allocation of risk.”); Parker, 
supra note 4, at 625 (arguing that because research and development employees have 
disadvantageous bargaining power, their rights in service products must be protected 
when rights were produced outside the scope of the employment relationship); see also 
Orbach, supra note 19, at 44 (With a lack of accessibility to legal enforcement, hiring 
parties wish to avoid litigation because “they often enjoy advantageous bargaining power 
that allows them to acquire more extensive rights than provided for by the default 
rules.”). See generally Richard E. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 
J. L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (explaining unequal bargaining power); Eyal Zamir, The 
Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 229–86 (1998) (regarding the positive 
effect of paternalism). 
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change in approach is needed.  Legislators should adopt a more 
paternalistic position and enact jus cogens legislation, which will 
apply even if parties contract for the opposite. 151F152 
Professor Catherine Fisk claimed that employees in research 
and development positions are not weak employees. 152F153  She argues, 
instead, that these are usually senior employees who are highly 
educated and receive high salaries, with high job mobility and who 
to a certain extent “determine” their own work conditions. 153F154  It 
would appear, however, that despite these characteristics, 
employees in research and development are subject to a power 
imbalance.  The work conditions of developers demand 
particularly hard work and long hours that exceed the boundaries 
of existing protective legislation.154F155  For the most part they are not 
organized, and, apart from a few “star” developers, do not enjoy 
preferential work conditions.  Further, the market is, for the most 
part, monopsonic.155F156  Despite the fact that certain employees may 
have greater work mobility, they nonetheless have no ability to 
choose between those workplaces that offer extra rights and those 
that do not.  Almost all firms require employees to waive their 
rights to intellectual products, and so in that sense, employees are 
limited in their ability to choose.  “Free competition” is therefore 
an illusion.156F157 
                                                                                                             
152 See Wolk, supra note 45, at 273 (positing that although there is no harmonization of 
laws across Europe in the matter of employed inventor remuneration, employees are 
normally awarded through mandatory provisions in national legislation). See generally 
Kennedy, supra note 120, at 590–91 (arguing that fundamental norms of international 
laws usually refer to groups such as consumers, employees, tenants). 
153 See FISK, supra note 81, at 178–88. 
154 See id. at 178–80 (stating that employees most likely to invent in the twentieth 
century were professionally trained, skilled engineers). 
155 Bartow, supra note 23, at 682–84. 
156 See Posner, supra note 19, at 425–26 (explaining that employers gain monopolies on 
power when employees are not aware of occupational alternatives, or when the costs of 
moving from one role to the other are high, or when employers coordinate their efforts by 
mutual restricting employees’ rights.); see also Bartow, supra note 23, at 683. 
157 See FISK, supra note 81, at 171, 181, 187 (asserting that ownership of inventions has 
become solely a matter of contract); see also Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice, 48 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 145, 153 (2000) (explaining that the employer or several other 
categories of those who commissioned the work are considered to be the authors under 
work made for hire doctrine, in contrast to the employee who is the natural author). 
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B. Cognitive Bias and Its Significance 
Recent psychology and legal scholarship has also put forth 
additional, compelling reasons why the free market does not 
succeed in regulating the division of IP rights in a manner that 
would obviate the need for binding legislative intervention.  
Specifically, it points to non-rational aspects of human conduct and 
their effect on the law.  Endorsers of these theories challenge the 
assumption that people act as rational logical beings who 
invariably seek to maximize utility; rather, they argue that the 
decision-making process is slanted by psychological and social 
biases. 157F158 Richard Epstein argued that recognition must be had for 
two central truths pertaining to the limitations of human nature in 
the realm of decision-making.  The first is the cognitive problem—
many people make cardinal mistakes in their decisions concerning 
important matters.  The second is the emotional problem—people 
do not control their feelings and, as a result, decision-making is 
impaired. 158F159 Further, inter-personal relationships provoke intense 
feelings that significantly influence the nature of individual 
interactions, often impairing rationality.  Indeed, overall it has been 
shown that individuals have difficulty making well-informed 
decisions about the future. 159F160 
                                                                                                             
158 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982) (showing that the effect of cognitive 
biases becomes stronger under uncertainty conditions); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, How 
Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
6, 7–11, 15–19, 30–35 (2002) (explaining the issues that exist in the gap between 
employees’ beliefs about their rights and reality in an employee-at-will context); 
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–87 (1998) (asserting that increased attention to 
actual human behavior can improve law and economics analysis); Daphna Lewinsohn–
Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical 
Observation from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219, 222 (2001) (arguing that 
owners exhibit a stronger endowment effect which suppresses efficient bargaining as well 
as demonstrating systematic under-compensating offers). 
159 See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market 
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112–15 (2006) (addressing two facts about human 
nature: the fact that people often make serious mistakes in deciding important matters, 
and the fact that people often find it hardest to keep their emotions in check when it 
matters the most). 
160 See id. at 112–13 (explaining that because people make errors about reality as well 
as about their preferences, most people will never be able to optimize anything); 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 158, at 267–71 (arguing that cognitive biases, such as 
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Over the last decade cognitive limits have merited renewed 
attention. 160F161 The importance of psychological bias, I argue, is even 
more acute in the employer-employee context, in which we cannot 
expect either party to operate in a rational manner, either with 
regard to the present contract or rights in future products.  The 
employer is in no hurry to waive its rights, even if it might be more 
efficient in the long run.  Conversely, the employee can expect to 
receive lower compensation in return for his or her waiver. 
One might question why the employer is unprepared to waive 
its rights in any employee work product as a means of 
incentivizing its employees to produce and invent if it results in a 
business advantage in the market.  One explanation might be the 
“endowment effect.” 161F162  People posit a greater value for something 
that they own.  This means that a person will demand a greater 
price for the waiver of an asset in his/her possession when 
compared to the price he/she would have been prepared to pay for 
the same item in possession of another.  The employer who holds 
the IP rights in the first place may feel that the product is already 
part of its property and will, therefore, be reluctant to waive any 
rights therein.  Alternatively, the price it may demand for such 
                                                                                                             
availability and the tendency to remember outstanding events; selective perception; 
computation limitations; data presentations and over-optimism regarding low probability 
risks are likely to impair the decision-making process even when thinking about a 
decision as simple as buying a TV set). 
161 The discourse on “cognitive bias” was first introduced by two distinguished scholars 
from the psychology field: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who established a 
cognitive basis theory for common human errors using heuristics and biases. See Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 
3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (defining cognitive bias as a pattern of perceptual 
distortion, inaccurate judgment, and illogical interpretation, which may lead to impaired 
judgment); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (developing of the prospect 
theory as a more realistic alternative to rational choice theory). But see, Norbert L. Kerr, 
Robert J. MacCoun, & Godfrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals 
and Groups, 103 (4) PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 687 (1996) (discussing that the magnitude of 
individual and group bias depends on several factors, and arguing that there is no simple 
answer to this issue). 
162 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 193–206 
(1991) (noting that people often demand much more to give up a particular object than 
they would be willing to pay to acquire it). 
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rights will be higher than the price the employee is prepared to or 
able to pay. 162F163 
Another explanation is the influence of the “status quo bias.” 163F164  
This bias gives rise to an unwillingness to deviate from an existing 
(legal) rule.  Employers are not enthusiastic about “innovation” if it 
means changing the prevailing norm, even if such change may 
actually increase profits in the long run.  The employee, on the 
other hand, will tend to be “over optimistic” about the future.164F165  
The employee is prepared to accept a job and a salary in the 
present without rationally considering the costs of a waiver of 
future profit.  This phenomenon may also be explained by the 
                                                                                                             
163 The endowment effect might explain the behavior of many institutions that refrain 
from giving rights to workers, despite knowledge by the employers that rights in the 
product, and royalties from their sales, will ultimately increase the motivation of the 
workers to create.  These institutions may still refuse employee rights despite 
publications according to which granting appropriate consideration to the employee-
inventor raised the income of the universities and hospitals that granted these rights. See 
Lewinsohn–Zamir, supra note 158, at 222 (asserting that a strong endowment effect was 
exhibited by owners and led to inefficient bargaining). 
164 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 612 (1998) (explaining that “[c]ontracting parties view default 
terms as part of the status quo and they prefer the status quo to alternative states”); 
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (stating that when we make a decision, we have a choice 
of doing nothing or maintaining someone’s current or previous decision (the status quo 
alternative) and that decision-making experiments reveal that individuals 
disproportionally stick to the status quo alternative). 
165 See generally Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above 
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993) (focusing on example of optimistic evaluations of young 
couples regarding the prospects of a successful marriage despite the well known, high 
rate of divorce); Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low 
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 566, 569–
571 (1989) (noting that people do not view risk in a rational way, even when the facts are 
well known; for example, they assume lower risk for car accidents even when being 
aware of real data to the contrary); Christine Jolls, Privacy and Consent Over Time: The 
Role of Agreement in Fourth Amendment Analysis, WM. & MARY L . REV 1693, 1704–05 
(2013) (arguing that employees agree to possible future intrusions on privacy because of 
cognitive bias such as over-optimism); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About 
Future Life Events, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 5, 806 (1980) (showing generally that 
people are optimistic regarding their risks); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, 
Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future, 15 J. OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 
(1996) (explaining that people assert they are less likely than others to experience 
negative events). 
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“discounting” effect.166  The employee does not take future profits 
into account, being more impressed by profits in the present (in the 
form of a high salary). 167
In sum, because individuals are likely to focus on short-term 
maximization, and not long-term efficiency, a legislative solution 
may be needed as a paternalistic means of inducing innovative 
change in the long run. 
  However, the conclusion leads the 
employee to mistakenly assume that, in the event of future profits, 
even if he or she does not expect personal profit in the present, he 
or she will nonetheless receive a certain portion of them. 
C. The Ineffectiveness of Labor Unions 
At this point, one might object and point to the existence of 
labor unions or collective organizations as an important available 
tool for narrowing unequal bargaining power and improved access 
to legal and economic information.168  Indeed, the collective power 
of organized inventors within the framework of freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining, along with jus 
cogens legislation, may have tremendous potential for striking a 
balance between the power of employees and that of employers 
and, thus, to generate a fairer and more appropriate arrangement.169  
However, such unions or associations of employee-inventors are 
not common in the U.S.170
                                                                                                             
166 See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and 
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1297 (1991) (concluding that many people, 
left to their own devices, will not save enough for their old age). 
  This may be attributable to the fact that 
once employee-inventors assign all the intellectual property rights 
to the employer by valid contracts, the organizations are deprived 
of their main source of bargaining power and, hence, are powerless 
to influence commercial relationships, which might otherwise have 
been formulated with greater emphasis on more equal distribution 
167 See id. at 1285–86 (1991). 
168 See STIGLITZ, supra note 52, at 86–88. 
169 See Peberdy and Strowel, supra note 14, at 66 (using the example of France where 
collective agreements governing all employees working in a particular industrial sector 
serve as a basis for calculating and deciding upon employees remuneration). 
170 See Bartow, supra note 23, at 677 (arguing that inventors should organize and act 
collectively). 
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of rights and benefits. 170F171  These organizations may also have to 
confront stringent competition laws. 171F172  Perhaps for these reasons, 
organizations of employees who are creators or inventors are 
barely recognized in American law.  Labor unions are usually 
involved in negotiations of work conditions and threshold social 
rights, and they are less involved in this particular realm.172F 173  
Moreover, the power of labor unions, in general, is gradually 
diminishing. 173F 174  And lastly, labor unions have been harshly 
criticized as a restrictive trade practice. 174F175 Thus, labor unions on 
their own cannot solve the power imbalance problem, nor can we 
expect their very existence to reflect efficient agreements made in 
a truly free market. 
VI. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES 
A. Limiting Transferability of Employee IP Rights 
My proposed model flips the existing norm in which employers 
are presumed to hold IP rights over employee work product.  
Rather, I propose that legislation mandate that employees hold IP 
rights in their work product, and that a transfer of these rights 
would only occur in certain cases, namely when the transfer would 
encourage productivity.  It is not disputed that one of the important 
aspects of IP, much like real property, is its transferability,175F176 and 
on one hand, transferability in this context reflects the autonomy 
                                                                                                             
171 See Bartow, supra note 23, at 715.  This article proposes a unique solution for the 
disincentive problem: rather than waiting for congressional or judicial action, inventors 
should organize and act collectively by refusing to sign any pre-invention assignment 
agreements in the future, by “revoking” pre-invention assignment agreements currently in 
effect, and by retaining ownership of their patented inventions. 
172 Shlomit Yanisky Ravid, Freedom Of Association Versus Competition Laws - 
Comparative Study) (unpublished manuscript). 
173 See Bartow, supra note 23, at 715. 
174 US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN LABOR HISTORY, available at 
http://economics.about.com/od/laborinamerica/a/labor_history.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 
2012). 
175 See Ravid, supra note 172 (noting that legal decisions preferred competition laws 
over freedom of association in most of the countries that participated in the comparative 
study). 
176 See JOSEPH T. MAHONEY, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY 109 (4th ed. 
2004). 
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and the freedom of employees to transfer, sell, or negotiate these 
rights.  On the other hand, however, as we have already 
established, employers are prone to “abuse” their negotiating 
power and demand that employees transfer all of their property 
rights up front.177
The interesting question is whether there should be a statutory 
enumeration of cases in which the transfer of rights is 
automatically deemed valid or whether there is a need for an 
explicit individual contract for each and any occasion in which the 
employee transfers his or her rights.  I will examine the advantages 
and disadvantages of each option below. 
  It is therefore suggested that employee transfers 
of IP rights be legislatively limited, and to determine a list of 
circumstances in which the law will neither permit nor recognize 
contracting out of employees’ rights when such a contract is to the 
detriment of the employee.  At the same time, an appropriate 
judicial forum should be established to rule on the question of 
whether a transfer in a particular case and under certain 
circumstances is detrimental to the employee and, hence, invalid.  
Other explicit contracts transferring employee IP rights that satisfy 
the conditions of fair transactional conditions will receive legal 
validity. 
The advantage of a statutory “automatic” transfer of rights to 
the employer lies in reduced transaction costs.  The law determines 
what the parties would have been likely to agree upon in the 
absence of a legal, statutory rule.  This kind of law would therefore 
save the costs of negotiating and drafting a separate agreement for 
each specific case. 178
In what follows, I will set forth some of the advantages of 
requiring an explicit contractual transfer as opposed to the 
automatic transfer of rights to the employer. 
  On the other hand, numerous advantages 
attach to the contractual transfer of rights from the employee to the 
employer. 
                                                                                                             
177 See supra Part V.A. 
178 See Christopher A. Riley, Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent, 
Conventionalism, and Efficiency, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 367–90 (2000) 
(examining three accepted explanations for the default option—subjective agreement, the 
accepted norm and economic efficiency). 
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(1) The slippery slope. The upfront statutory transfer may 
obliterate the concept of employees’ rights in IP work products, or 
at least divest it of any content.  A statutory determination that 
automatically awards IP rights to employers paves the way for 
broadening employers’ rights in a broad spectrum of cases.  This 
statutory presumption in favor of the employer may create a 
slippery slope in the wake of excessively broad interpretations of 
cases in which IP rights are deemed de facto invested in 
employers.179
(2) Normative value. From a normative perspective, when 
there is an up-front transfer to the employer, the employer is 
perceived as the first and rightful owner of the right.  The latter 
conception is the precise opposite of the model proposed in this 
Article, according to which the creator or the inventor is presumed 
the de facto owner of the rights.  The contractual approach is thus 
more consistent with this normative presumption. 
  Transfer of IP rights to the employer is undesirable 
when the connection between the service and the product is 
tenuous, such as when the product relates to an area in which the 
employer itself is involved, even if the employee is not ETI and the 
employer did not invest resources in the development of the 
product. 
(3) Employee awareness. When the law confers the rights to 
the employers up-front, employees are not necessarily aware of 
their waiver of rights and transfer to the employer because the 
arrangement will apply even when the specific employment 
contract is silent on the matter, i.e., in cases of ETI.  The statutory 
conferral of rights to the employer obviates the need to specify the 
transfer in the employment contract.  According to the model 
proposed in this Article, employee awareness of rights is important 
per se.  A fair negotiation of a rights transfer to the employer can 
only take place, if at all, if the transfer is explicitly referred to in 
the employment contract, providing certainty that the employee is 
aware of this waiver after the invention has reached a concrete 
form, and the contract further provides for compensation.  A 
statutory transfer, after the invention is developed, circumvents the 
possibility of negotiation.  An automatic transfer thus precludes the 
                                                                                                             
179 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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possibility of the better-informed party, in this case the employer, 
disclosing valuable information to the less-informed party, in this 
case the employee. 
(4) Burden of proof. When an employee transfers to the 
employer a right that originally belonged to the employee, it is 
likely that the transferee (the employer) bears the onus of proving 
the fulfillment of the conditions required to validate the transfer.  
When the law determines that, under certain conditions, the right 
vests with the employer, then the employee would bear the burden 
of proof—and, as the employee has less resources at his or her 
disposal and, very likely, less information, he or she may not be 
able to meet that burden as well as the employer might be able to. 
(5) Tax benefits.  The transfer of property to the employee and 
its subsequent transfer to the employer are also important for tax 
reasons.  If the property belongs to the employee and the employee 
transfers it to the employer, subject to certain conditions, then the 
asset is a capital asset, and subject to a lower taxation rate. 180  
When property is originally vested in the employer, the payment of 
consideration to the employee may be viewed as a payment of 
revenue, in which case higher tax rates would apply.181
(6) Power discrepancies. A rule that allocates to the employer 
all rights in advance reflects the power discrepancies between the 
parties discussed above.
 
182
(7) Low transaction costs.  The employee-employer 
relationship is a close one that can be regulated by employment 
  It establishes the advance “surrender” 
of the weaker party in the form of a waiver of rights. 
                                                                                                             
180 See Justine P. Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A Tax Overview, 29 
TAX L. 553, 554 (1975-1976). 
181 See ISABEL VERLINDEN, AXEL SMITS & BART LIEBEN (LANDWELL), INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM A TRANSFER PRICING PERSPECTIVE 50, 72 (2002) (stating that the 
legal owner is an important concept in the United States; generally concurs with the view 
that the legal owner of the intangible asset is also the party entitled to the income; the tax 
consequences of an assignment will, for the most part, be determined by what has 
happened in the development phase, and whether one group company has itself done the 
development, or if the work has been done under a R&D contract, or if the work has been 
done under a cost-sharing arrangement); Morreale, supra note 180, at 554–57 (noting that 
a license from the developer might be considered as a sale for tax purposes and 
independent inventor enjoys benefits when licensing the invention). 
182 See discussion supra Part II. 
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agreements and, as such, the transaction costs are likely to be 
low.183
(8) Information-forcing mechanism. As has already been 
briefly discussed above, a contractual transfer may, in certain 
circumstances, encourage the employer to disclose critical 
information.  An employer not satisfied by the statutory default 
model (assuming that the law confers IP rights to employees) will 
seek to establish an explicit opposite rule in the contract ensuring 
that valuable information is transferred to the other party.  The 
very act of determining a condition which is the opposite of the 
default option directs the employee’s attention to the explicit 
arrangement in the contract and motivates the employer to transfer 
the information in its possession to the employee—what Ian Ayres 
and Robert Gertner call “penalty defaults” or an information-
forcing rule.
 
184
(9) Just deserts. When the employers “merit” receiving all of 
the rights, they receive extra privileges that they would almost 
certainly not have received in an automatic transfer where the 
employer is presumed deserving of such rights. 
 
(10) Consideration required. Such a transfer to the employer 
would more likely require consideration to be paid to the 
employee, whereas in an automatic transfer the employee would 
likely receive nothing in addition to ordinary salary.  The policy 
proposed in this Article stresses a de facto allocation of rights 
                                                                                                             
183 See Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Transaction Costs, Power 
Abuse, and the Employment Relation: Economic Origins of Authority 2 (Sept. 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://whu.edu/static/geaba/Symposium/2011/
Papiere/E1-Bartling.pdf (“[T]he employment contract is more flexible because the 
employer can quickly adjust the service to be provided . . . . On the other hand . . . the 
employment contract can force the employee to choose an inefficient action that is most 
profitable for the employer but very costly for the employee.”). 
184 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989-1990) (suggesting penalty 
defaults rules within a contract be purposefully designed to encourage the parties to 
reveal information to each other or to third parties and that the law should be designed 
efficiently to encourage the side who holds the information to share it with the other 
side); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1991-1992) (stating that contingently 
incomplete contracts give certain private parties incentives to either renegotiate or breach 
the original contract to realize these additional gains from trade). 
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and/or benefits to the employee and for the transfer of rights from 
employed inventors to the employer only in particular 
circumstances, that is, at the advanced stages of product 
development.  According to my proposal, employed inventors 
would be entitled to receive extra-salary compensation for 
transferring their rights to their employers.  The compensation 
would be anchored in a jus cogens rule.  Complementary 
mechanisms would be established to void a transfer in the event of 
non-payment of consideration and provide a mechanism for 
resolving disputes concerning what, or how much, constitutes 
adequate consideration. 
Moreover, the inefficiency deriving from the absence of 
international regulation and coordination of employee-inventor 
rights stresses the need to establish an international tool, under the 
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
that would address and regulate the allocation of rights within the 
workplace. 
B. Special Consideration 
The subject of consideration is not mentioned as an alternative 
to my proposal in this Article, but rather stresses the need for 
adequate consideration in any transfer of rights from the employee 
to the employer.  Unlike in the U.S., a number of substantial 
compensation awards have been made recently in Europe. 184F185 For 
example, the Patents Court in the United Kingdom (U.K.) awarded 
considerable compensation in the case of Kelly v. GE Healthcare 
in 2009.185F186  Two inventors were awarded £1.5 million  (about $2.2 
million).186F187  Moreover, a former employee of the French National 
                                                                                                             
185 See Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63, 65 (“The source of employee inventor 
compensation laws differs from country to country.  Many European countries (including 
the UK, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Spain and Hungary) include 
employee inventor compensation provisions in their national patent legislation.  Others, 
such as Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Poland, have enacted specific 
employee compensation laws.  Belgium does not provide a statutory right to 
compensation, although a right has developed through case law . . . .”). 
186 See Kelly v. GE Healthcare, [2009] EWHC (Pat) 181, [207] (Eng.). 
187 See id. But see Pebery & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63, 65 (suggesting that this case 
may not be as significant as many have predicted as the invention—the Myoview—was 
easily recognized as belonging to Amersham (the employer) and, given that it was a best-
selling product, its benefit to the employer in term of income was easily measured). 
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Railways was awarded more than $750,000 from a court in Paris 
for inventing a system that allowed the railway to save around $22 
million annually. 187F 188 The justifications for doing so have been 
explained in this Article.188F189  The principal reason for this is that 
consideration is necessary to create incentive as well as 
compensatory mechanisms that establish the link between 
compensation and commercial success of the product.  Inventors’ 
desire for cooperation in the process of transferring intellectual 
property includes the desire to ensure their own financing and to 
profit in excess of their existing salary. 189F190 
For example, the scholar Jay Dratler has argued that, under a 
pro-employer regime, employees lack motivation which might lead 
to the diminishment of intellectual products.190F191  Incentive bonuses, 
currently in place in certain firms, are not enough.191F 192    An 
employee whose invention is approved by a company committee 
will receive a fixed-sum bonus, which is far lower than his or her 
salary.  Exceptional or tremendous displays of incentive, initiative, 
and investment should not be expected in that situation.  
Conceivably, in the Anglo-American allocation regime, which 
allocates property rights to the employer by way of law or contract, 
granting adequate financial incentives to employed inventors, 
when economic efficiency justifies transferring property rights to 
the employer, creates an appropriate balance between the 
conflicting interests of the employee, employer, and public.  A rule 
that institutionalizes the duty of paying consideration to employees 
in any transfer of rights to employers somewhat blunts the 
criticism of such one-sided transfers.  In order to overcome the 
motivation problem, firms have developed complex incentivizing 
mechanisms.192F 193  However, these voluntary plans, initiated at the 
                                                                                                             
188 See Pebery & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63. 
189 See discussion supra Part IV. 
190 See Merges, supra note 19, at 3, 38–52, 53–54 (justifying payment of consideration 
to employee-inventors from a law and economics perspective). 
191 See Dratler, supra note 23, at 185–86 (suggesting that the allocation of patent rights 
provided by the present legal structure entirely misses the goal of promoting innovation 
within firms). 
192 See discussion supra Part IV. 
193 See Merges, supra note 19, at 39, 40 (dividing incentive into four groups: (1) 
promotion of the creative employee; (2) granting a bonus to an employee for a particular 
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discretion of the firms, are not sufficient.  Such compensation 
schemes should be mandated by statute to ensure optimal 
efficiency. 
The issue of employee compensation is important, not only to 
inventors, but also to the industry and innovation level in the U.S.  
However, it is worth noting that there are significant differences, 
even among jurisdictions adopting a legally-binding compensation 
regime.  At one end, in the U.K., claims are rarely granted, but are 
likely to be significant.193F194  At the other, in France, compensation is 
routine, but typically at a much lower level.194F 195   Countries like 
France, which usually assess compensation at the time when the 
invention was made, typically award lower amounts of 
compensation than those countries, such as the U.K., which 
calculate compensation after the invention has been exploited. 195F196 
Consideration is a more effective tool than other incentives like 
granting a limited monopoly over patents, in that consideration 
increases the amount of intellectual products and their quality 
without payment of the social price caused by broadening 
monopolies.196F 197  Consideration is also preferred over direct 
government investment in these fields because the latter requires 
                                                                                                             
invention; (3) a product that provides the basis for a bonus to the employee; and (4) 
administrative evaluation of the invention along with the employee’s evaluation). 
194 See Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63–66. 
195 See id. at 66–67. 
196 Id. (suggesting that the later the compensation is paid, the larger the amount that is 
paid); Wolk, supra note 45, at 296 (“There are two different legislative approaches in 
Europe, as well as a disparity between, on one hand, UK law, and on the other hand, 
French, German, Spanish and Swedish law.  In the United Kingdom, the threshold is very 
high because of the ‘outstanding benefit’ requirement, and employee inventors are rarely 
awarded additional compensation.”). 
197 Consideration is preferable to the extension of the exclusivity period for rights 
holders and the fortification of monopolistic rights given today. See STIGLITZ, supra note 
52, at 346–47 (Monopolistic rights in intellectual products create a low level of creation 
and a higher price of the product during the protection period.  Regarding this point, there 
is constant tension between dynamic efficiency by way of motivation for investment and 
static efficiency which means that companies will continue to produce until the point at 
which the price is equal to the marginal profit.  To the extent that the protection period is 
shorter, so too the party who is not the owner of the rights in the product will be able to 
benefit from future developments.  The shortening of the protection period reduces the 
cost of a creation that relies on another creation.); POSNER, supra note 19, at 41 (noting 
that the contribution of future payment of royalties towards the creator’s motivation in 
creating becomes negligible). 
2013] RETHINK INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 195 
 
large sums of public tax money. 197F198   If consideration increases the 
overall public “cake,” it does so because it occurs without any 
extra “payment” or investment from the public. 
In sum, I propose an explicit statutory arrangement for the 
payment of consideration to inventors and creators apart from their 
salary.  Such payment should take place only after the product is in 
its advanced stages of development, when both parties have clear 
data at their disposal as to fair value. 
The relevant statute should establish jus cogens arrangements, 
which accommodate the possibility of adjusting the contractual 
consideration in the event of a change in circumstances, for 
example, if the product proves to be wildly successful. Such 
decisions would be made by an administrative body who would 
take into account factors such as product royalties in making its 
final decision of what constitutes adequate consideration. 
C. A “Red Carpet” for Entrepreneurs 
In addition, different rules should apply to those who are risk 
averse and those who are not.  Where employees are not risk 
averse, it is not appropriate to apply the paradigm of “risk 
exchange” in exchange for a waiver of property rights in the 
product.  An employee who is willing to take risks or is risk neutral 
might very well become an entrepreneur.  Employees in this 
category should be encouraged to develop intellectual products, 
and thus even be induced by an allocation of rights in their favor.  
Failure to secure such an employee’s rights in the product may 
cause the employee to forget about significant innovation or 
“smuggle” the intellectual product outside the firm in order to 
begin his or her own development of the product, even if it 
involves certain risk.  Thus, a proper policy would allow such 
employees a “red carpet” to safely develop their products.198F199 
                                                                                                             
198 See STIGLITZ, supra note 52, at 348; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of 
Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006) (supporting using 
private laws with tax system in order to promote distribution justice). 
199 The employer might get compensation according to the amount which the employer 
has invested in the invention. 
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D. Attributing Inventors 
An inventor’s entitlement to attribution rights in the inventions 
he or she has developed might also play a major factor in 
enhancing innovative activity in the workplace.  Publishing the 
name of the inventor is very important, not only from a personality 
perspective, but also for economic reasons. 200  Traditionally, the 
rule was that patents were declared invalid if the wrong inventors 
were named on the patent. This gave parties prosecuting a patent 
application an incentive to name every inventor.201  Unfortunately, 
the America Invents Act 202  changed the tradition of the patent 
filing system, which previously published the name of the inventor 
himself in the public record and contained his or her name in the 
patent application. 203   The new law makes it much easier for 
employers to avoid attribution of inventions and patents to 
employees and to unilaterally file patent applications on their 
behalf.  Under this new regime, employee contribution suffers 
from a lack of visibility and lack of quantification.  Therefore, we 
should return to the traditional model where patents are attributed 
to the employees who have developed them.204
 CONCLUSION 
 
Advancement of an appropriate policy for IP work products 
has become critical in an era where there is much interest in raising 
the level of innovation nationally.  Insofar as most inventions are 
invented in corporate frameworks, we must begin to analyze what 
drives employee inventive spirit in the workplace.  This Article 
                                                                                                             
200 See Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark Conception of Moral 
Rights, 122 YALE L. J. 218, 234 (2012) (arguing that the adoption of moral rights is 
beneficial because it will likely increase with the value of the work itself). 
201 See Merges, supra note 16, at 2218 (“Patents were routinely declared invalid when 
the wrong inventors were listed on a patent,” giving the party prosecuting a patent 
application a strong incentive to name all inventors.). 
202 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
203 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
204 See POLINSKY, supra note 80, at 131–32 (suggesting that it is easier to identify the 
employer as the one responsible for the product’s success and to provide him an incentive 
accordingly and, yet, it is difficult to measure how much each member of a working team 
contributed to the product). 
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claims that the current structure of the pro-corporate regime exacts 
a price in terms of the quantity and quality of intellectual property 
inventions and, thus, may be highly inefficient.  In establishing the 
appropriate policy, consideration should be had for the conditions 
of uncertainty that are inherent in the development of IP products 
and employee inventions, especially when employees waive all 
rights before any products have even been conceived.  Specifically, 
this Article examines transactional uncertainties, risk allocation 
and Principal-Agent relationships, and their effect on IP policy 
aimed to enhance employee productivity in times of economic 
crises or recession.  The discussion relies on the foundational 
underpinnings of law and economics theory, but applies its 
presumptions in a new light, looking at the uncertain circumstances 
surrounding the transaction at the time when rights are transferred 
and, consequently, its normative significance. 
From an economic perspective, incentives should be given to 
motivate employees to create and to invest in and disclose their 
inventions for the public welfare. Indeed, under certain 
circumstances, it becomes justified to confer all rights in employee 
inventions to the employer, but such a carte blanche conferral 
would be overly broad and would not take into account economic, 
and other, claims that justify the allocation of rights and certain 
benefits specifically to the employee.  I conclude that these 
considerations are consistent with the overall spirit of encouraging 
competition, employee mobility and creative ingenuity.  
